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INTRODUCTION
helley v. Kraemer, the 1948 decision that famously disallowed state
courts from enforcing racially restrictive covenants, has proven
to be a very difficult case to rationalize. The Fourteenth
Amendment, on which the Shelley Court relied, long had been held to apply to
state actors but not individuals. Shelley did not purport to alter this, but where
was the state action necessary for invoking the Fourteenth Amendment, given
that the restrictive covenants were private contracts? The Court’s answer was
that although the restrictive covenants themselves were perfectly legal, judicial
enforcement of the covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause because a contract’s substantive provisions should be
attributed to the state when a court enforces it. Under this critical component
of Shelley’s reasoning – what the Article refers to as Shelley’s “attribution”
rationale – courts could enforce only those contractual provisions that could
have been enacted into general law. Because the Equal Protection Clause
would not have allowed a law that banned African Americans from purchasing
real property, it followed from Shelley’s analysis that judicial enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants also was unconstitutional.
Shelley’s attribution logic threatened to dissolve the distinction between
state action, to which Fourteenth Amendment limitations apply, and private
action, which falls outside of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purview. After all,
Shelley’s approach, “consistently applied, would require individuals to conform
their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as almost
always, the individuals might later seek the security of potential judicial
enforcement.” This Article shows that, primarily for this reason, neither the
Supreme Court nor lower courts have applied Shelley’s approach. Courts
routinely enforce contracts whose substantive provisions could not have been
constitutionally enacted by government. For instance, courts regularly enforce
settlement agreements that limit the settling party’s ability to speak publicly in
various respects, despite the fact that statutory limitations on the identical
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334 U.S. 1 (1948).
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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speech would be unconstitutional. Similarly, courts regularly have enforced
testamentary provisions that condition inheritance on a child’s marrying within
a particular faith, despite the fact that the Establish Clause precludes states
from enacting the identical provision. This Article then explains why this
widespread judicial practice of eschewing Shelley’s rationale, and the pervasive
norm of respecting the public/private distinction, are desirable.
But if Shelley’s rationale has not survived, can the case’s holding be
justified? The Article shows that, perhaps surprisingly, neither courts nor
scholars yet have been able to provide a satisfying answer; the many scholarly
efforts to explain Shelley, which comprise an assortment of proposals to narrow
the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment holding, all have deep analytical flaws,
and courts have not even made a serious effort to reconcile Shelley’s holding
with the contracts they regularly enforce. The Article then offers a wholly new
rationale for Shelley that provides a principled basis for explaining both Shelley
and the post-Shelley case law. The Article’s suggestion diverges more radically
from the Shelley Court’s stated rationale than have the scholarly and judicial
proposals to date: whereas scholars and courts have continued to explain
Shelley as a constitutional decision grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment,
this Article argues that Shelley is best understood as having been decided on the
basis of non-constitutional federal law that emerges from the Thirteenth
Amendment.
As the Article explains, an early Supreme Court decision held that the
Thirteenth Amendment applies to individuals as well as states, and also
concluded that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the
power to abolish the incidents of slavery, which the Court understood to
include “disabilit[ies] to hold property [or] to make contracts.” Racially
restrictive covenants implicate both property and contract rights and hence fall
within Congress’s Section 2 powers. Furthermore, since the late nineteenth
century there have existed two federal statutes, enacted under Congress’s
section 2 powers, whose language readily could have been applied to racially
restrictive covenants. One statute provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property.” A second statute states that “[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens .
. .” The Article explains how these statutes could have been used to strike
down racially restrictive covenants, definitively establishes that these statutes
were known to the Shelley Court, and considers why the Court eschewed them
as a basis for its holding in the case.
8
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See cases discussed infra at Part I.B.1.
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42 U.S.C. §1981 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §41 at the time of Shelley, as discussed infra Part III).
9

[2006]

Reconceptualizing Shelley

4

The Article then provides responses to two potential objections to
grounding Shelley in statutory law. First, the Article establishes the legitimacy
of reconceptualizing already-decided cases on grounds not identified in the
opinion, primarily by showing that the Court regularly does so. Second, the
Article answers the objection that its statutory approach opens the door to the
uncomfortable conclusion that racially restrictive covenants would have been
legal and enforceable in the event Congress had not enacted the abovementioned civil rights statutes in the late 1800s. The Article explains that the
Court still could have declared the racially restrictive covenants illegal under
a form of federal common law that this Article dubs “constitutional
preemption.” Akin to dormant commerce clause doctrine, constitutional
preemption would have allowed the Court to strike down state or private
activity that constituted an incident or badge of slavery because Congress had
the power to so regulate, even though the congressional power had not been
exercised at the time of the Court’s decision.
This sort of judicial
determination would have had the status of federal common law, not
constitutional law, an important distinction that the Article explains in detail.
Recognizing that the mere fact that Shelley could be reconceptualized
as a Thirteenth Amendment-grounded decision does not establish that it
should be, the Article then identifies seven benefits of presently
reconceptualizing Shelley. First, the Article explains why a Thirteenth
Amendment basis for the decision is more conceptually sound. Because the
Thirteenth Amendment (unlike the Fourteenth Amendment) applies to
individuals, it could target what really made racially restrictive covenants
problematic: what was troubling was not the covenants’ enforcement but
their substantive content, which is best understood as the product of
individuals’ activities rather than action of the state.
Second, and relatedly, because the Thirteenth Amendment applies to
individuals, it provides a basis for declaring the racially restrictive covenants
themselves to be illegal, not just their enforcement. The Article’s Thirteenth
Amendment approach hence eliminates a particularly noxious by-product of
the Shelley Court’s analytics: the Court’s conclusion that racially restrictive
covenants themselves were perfectly legal. This is important. The covenants’
legality not only has been an embarrassment to American jurisprudence, but
a persuasive recent study has concluded that unenforceable restrictive
covenants played an important role in entrenching racially segregated housing
markets in this country.
Third, the Article’s Thirteenth Amendment approach is far more
consistent with post-Shelley case law, which virtually never holds that judicial
enforcement of a contract constitutes sufficient state involvement to trigger
the application of constitutional constraints to the contract’s substantive
provisions. The Article’s approach hence provides doctrinal clarity by
13
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furnishing legal principles that explain a large body of case law that seems
mystifying under the Shelley Court’s Fourteenth Amendment approach.
Further, the post-Shelley case law simultaneously indicts Shelley’s Fourteenth
Amendment rationale and endorses this Article’s suggestion; the foundational
logic behind the common law method is that legal principles sometimes only
can be inductively identified by observing patterns that emerge over time
across large numbers of cases, and this common law logic hence suggests that
the post-Shelley case law itself constitutes potent evidence that the Thirteenth
Amendment provides the valid legal basis for indicting racially restrictive
covenants, not the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fourth, reconceptualizing Shelley as a Thirteenth Amendment-based
decision may permit the creation of a more principled state action doctrine.
This is so because the Thirteenth Amendment approach wholly removes
Shelley from the state action context (for there is no need to identify state
action in respect of a constitutional provision that applies to both private
parties and the state), thereby freeing the state action doctrine from the
hopeless task of identifying state action on Shelley’s facts. Fifth, and relatedly,
reorienting Shelley relieves stress on the distinction between public and private
that Shelley engendered; due to the case’s exceedingly high profile, Shelley’s
muddling of the distinction between public and private has fueled some
scholars’ suggestions that the public/private distinction is hopelessly indistinct
and ought to be discarded, a position that has implications far beyond the state
action doctrine.
Sixth, understanding Shelley as a Thirteenth Amendment-based
decision has important institutional implications. Whereas Shelley’s Fourteenth
Amendment approach allocated the determination of what contracts should
be enforceable solely to courts, the legal basis for the decision suggested here
– Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment – is a grant of congressional
legislative power that accordingly invites Congress and the President to
participate in determining what types of restrictive covenants (or other
activities) qualify as incidents or badges of slavery. The Article then identifies
the type of analysis that is involved in determining what constitutes incidents
and badges of slavery, and shows that the more political branches have
competencies that make their participation in this decisionmaking process
extremely valuable.
Seventh, and finally, Shelley helped solidify a constitutional culture that
largely overlooks the Thirteenth Amendment and instead relies primarily on
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection principles. The
Article identifies some of the pernicious consequences of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s marginalization, and suggests that reconceptualizing Shelley may
have the welcomed effect of reviving Thirteenth Amendment principles that
long have been dormant.
The Article is in four parts. Part I shows that the case law almost
universally has rejected Shelley’s attribution rationale without having offered a
principled explanation for having done so. Part II shows the inadequacy of
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the scholarly efforts to reconceptualize Shelley that have been provided until
now, critiquing proposed solutions that have come from Professors Louis
Henkin, Louis Pollak, Laurence Tribe, David Strauss, Carol Rose, Robert
Glennon and John Nowak, among others. In short, Parts I and II together
show that the legal community consistently has sought to find an alternative
rationale for Shelley, but that these efforts have understood the case as a
constitutional decision grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment. Parts III and
IV are the heart of the Article. Part III first establishes the legitimacy of
reconceptualizing earlier Supreme Court decisions and then makes the positive
law argument that Shelley is readily understood as a Thirteenth Amendmentbased decision. Part IV makes the normative case for reconceptualizing
Shelley, explaining the many benefits of grounding Shelley in the largely
overlooked Thirteenth Amendment. A short conclusion follows.
I.
SHELLEY ’S ANALYTICAL SHORTCOMINGS AND ITS PROGRESSIVE
NARROWING IN THE CASE LAW
After briefly describing the Shelley decision, this Part examines the postShelley case law, showing that courts almost uniformly have refused to apply
Shelley’s rationale in subsequent cases.
A. Shelly itself. In 1911, thirty property owners, who together owned
forty-seven mostly contiguous parcels of land in Missouri, signed a private
contract intended to run with the land, that accordingly was recorded
thereafter. The agreement was a restrictive covenant providing that a condition
precedent to the sale of any and all the 47 properties was that they should not
be occupied by “any person not of the Caucasian race.” In exchange for
valuable consideration, Mr. and Mrs. Shelley, who were African-Americans,
received a warranty deed to one of the parcels of land subject to the restrictive
covenant from one Mr. Fitzgerald. Kraemer, an owner of one of the other
parcels of land, thereafter sued Shelley in state court, asking the court to
enforce the agreement and divest title out of the Shelleys. The Supreme Court
of Missouri ruled that the covenant should be enforced.
The United States Supreme Court famously reversed, holding that
judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenant would violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But arriving at so
normatively attractive an outcome was not doctrinally simple. The chief
obstacle was the understanding that “the action inhibited by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be
that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”
Thus even though
“restrictions on the right of occupancy of the sort sought to be created by the
private agreements in these cases could not be squared with the requirements
15
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Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 21.
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Id. at 13.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state statute or local ordinance,”
the restrictive covenant in this case did “not involve action by state legislatures
or city councils.” The Court accordingly held that the restrictive agreements
“standing alone cannot be regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment” and hence were not themselves unconstitutional.
But the Court’s analysis did not end there. Though the restrictive
covenant itself could not be said to be “action by the State” triggering the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court ruled that “the action of state courts and
of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the
State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” After all, the “full
coercive power of government” was being used to “to deny to petitioners, on
the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights.” Furthermore,
because enforcement orders came from courts, the “judicial action in each case
bears the clear and unmistakable imprimatur of the State.”
One analytical step remained. After establishing that a court’s order to
enforce a contract constituted state action, the question became what aspects
of the enforcement order were attributable to the State. Without explanation,
the Court determined that the substantive provisions of the contract
themselves were appropriately deemed to be action of the state. Under Shelley’s
“attribution” rationale, the question became whether a state could have enacted
into general law the contract’s substantive provision. Because it could not
have, it followed that enforcing the restrictive covenant also violated the
guarantee of equal protection.
B.
The Post-Shelley Case Law. Subsection 1 shows that Shelley’s
attribution rationale has not been followed. With only a few exceptions, Shelley
has been confined to the context of racial discrimination. American courts
regularly issue orders enforcing private agreements where identical the
restrictions enacted by a state legislature as general law would have triggered
constitutional scrutiny. Arguments that court orders enforcing such private
agreements qualify as state action under Shelley, and accordingly trigger
constitutional scrutiny, have been regularly rebuffed. Subsection 2 reviews the
limited circumstances where Shelley has been applied. Both subsections also
show that neither the courts that have extended nor those that have limited
Shelley have provided satisfactory explanations as to the scope of the principle
of Shelley that they embrace.
1.
Shelley Limited. First consider court enforcement of
private agreements that curtail speech, what is one of the most favored rights
18
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under contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. Particularly instructive are
those cases where a party has sought to judicially enforce a settlement
agreement limiting speech since settlement agreements, by their nature, always
involve courts. Even where the settlement agreement has been entered into
the docket by a court order, enforcement of the agreement has been held to
not constitute state action. For instance, in United Egg Producers v. Standard
Brands, Inc., two companies signed a settlement stipulation that had been
entered into the docket by a court order in which each agreed to restrict their
advertisements and thereby to limit their “First Amendment rights on
commercial speech.”
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “court
enforcement of that agreement is not governmental action for First
Amendment purposes.” The Court limited Shelley to the “racial discrimination
context,” reasoning that “if, for constitutional purposes, every private right
were transformed into governmental action by the mere fact of court
enforcement of it, the distinction between private and governmental action
would be obliterated.” Consider as well a state appellate court that confronted
the question of whether the First Amendment precluded it from enforcing a
settlement agreement in which a person had agreed not to publicly criticize a
certain type of psychological therapy. Despite the fact that the party’s speech
was deemed to be in the public interest, and even though “one party’s free
speech rights [were] restricted by that agreement,” the court ruled that
enforcement did not constitute state action and upheld the agreement.
The pattern of judicial enforcement of agreements limiting speech
continues outside the context of settlement agreements. Plaintiffs in one case
sued in state court to enforce a provision in a lease agreement that prohibited
tenants from distributing unsolicited newspapers. The defendants cited to
Shelley and argued that enforcement of the provision would constitute state
action, triggering heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. An appeals
court in California rejected this argument and issued the requested injunction,
reasoning that “[a]lthough the United States Supreme Court has held that
judicial effectuation of a racially restrictive covenant constitutes state action, it
has largely limited this holding to the facts of those cases.” Similarly, the
Kansas Supreme Court ruled that judicially enforcing a restrictive covenant
barring the posting of signs does not qualify as state action. In finding Shelley
27
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44 F.3d 940 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 943.
29
Id.
30
Id.; see also id. (“where a court acts to enforce the right of a private party which is permitted but not
compelled by law, there is no state action for constitutional purposes in the absence of a finding that
constitutionally impermissible discrimination is involved.”).
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Id. (quoting Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
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State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858 (Wash. App. Ct. 2000), review denied by Calof v. Casebber, 22 P.3d 802 (Wash.
2001).
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Id at 871 (emphasis supplied).
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Id. at 870.
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Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Association, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (Cal. 2001).
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Id. at 1034.
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Linn Valley Lakes Property Owners Association v. Brockway, 824 P.2d 948, 951 (Kan. 1992).
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to be inapplicable, the Kansas court rejected the argument that “the test to be
employed is whether a valid ordinance could be passed prohibiting the conduct
proscribed in the restrictive covenant,” thus explicitly forswearing what I have
called Shelley’s “attribution” rationale.
Shelley’s attribution rationale also has been rejected outside the context
of private agreements limiting speech.
The Establishment Clause
unquestionably would preclude a State from enacting testamentary rules that
condition inheritance on a child’s marrying a person of a particular religious
faith. Courts have found, however, that judicial enforcement of wills
containing such provisions does not constitute state action. As another
example, due process requires that courts use specific procedures before
imposing punitive damages. Though arbitration panels that issue punitive
damages do not use these procedures, the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that
judicial enforcement of arbitral awards of punitive damages does not constitute
state action. In so ruling, the court limited Shelley:
38

39

40

41

42

The holding of Shelley . . . has not been extended beyond the context
of race discrimination . . . . Instead, the concept of state action has
since been narrowed by the Supreme Court . . . . We likewise decline
to extend Shelley and hold that the mere confirmation of a private
arbitration award by a district court is insufficient state action to
trigger the application of the Due Process Clause.
43

It commonly is stated in cases, both federal (as exemplified by the
Eleventh Circuit decision discussed immediately above) and state, that the rule

38

Id.
See also Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condominium Association v. Cappuccio, 673 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996)( holding that judicial enforcement of a condominium association’s prohibition on the
posting of “for sale” signs was not state action and consequently did not trigger the First Amendment);
cf. Langley v. Monumental Corporation, 496 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Md. 1980). For an unusual recent case
that held otherwise, see Gerber v. Longboat Harbour North Condominium Inc, 724 F.Supp. 884, 886
(M.D. Fal. 1989) (judicial enforcement of condominium regulation barring flying of American flag
constitutes state action). For a harsh critique of the Gerber court’s reasoning and holding, see Goldberg
v. 400 East Ohio Condominium Association, 12 F.Supp.2d 820, 822-23 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“old-fashioned
legal patriotism, rather than old-fashioned legal reasoning, is the source of the Gerber opinion’s persuasive
force . . . Put another way, Gerber is not good law.”).
40
See, e.g., Shapira v. Union National Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827-28 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1974);
Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197 (1955). Referring to these cases, Professor Sherman has noted that
“Shelley v. Kraemer has been cited in only two reported cases dealing with testamentary conditions
affecting religious practice, and on each occasion the court upheld the validity of the condition and found
Shelley to be inapposite.” Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273 n. 188 (1999).
41
Indeed, as the federal appeals court noted,
in the arbitration setting we have almost none of the protections that fundamental
fairness and due process require for the imposition of this sort of punishment.
Discovery is abbreviated if available at all. The rules of evidence are employed, if at
all, in a very relaxed manner. The factfinders (here the panel) operate with almost
none of the controls and safeguards assumed in Haslip.
Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted).
42
Davis, 59 F.3d at 1190.
43
Id.
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of Shelley is limited to the context of racial discrimination. Two points are
worth noting. First, these efforts to narrow Shelley are best understood as
descriptive rather than normative, for no court decision has sought to explain
why a race-specific attribution rule is desirable or rational. Instead, what is
found are ipse dixit assertions that race is different, without an explanation as
to why this should be so. If anything, the paeans to preserving the distinction
between public and private found in these court decisions are better
understood as a critique of Shelley, rather than an explanation as to why a racespecific Shelley rule is wise. It is hard to escape the conclusion that these courts
are simply narrowing Shelley to its facts, unconcerned with locating a principle
that can reconcile their holding with the Shelley decision.
Second, although assertions that Shelley has been limited to the context
of racial discrimination are widespread in the opinions, the careful analysis of
post-Shelley Supreme Court jurisprudence provided in the next subsection
shows that this is not accurate. The Court has declined to extend Shelley even
in situations of racial discrimination that raise state action questions very similar
to Shelley. Apart from one case decided only five years after Shelley, it is more
accurate to say that the Supreme Court has narrowed Shelley to its facts.
2.
Shelley Applied and Extended. This subsection first
reviews the limited context in which the Supreme Court has applied Shelley’s
holding. It then examines the handful of lower court opinions that have
extended Shelley.
a. Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court clearly
extended Shelley in only one instance, the 1953 in the case of Barrows v. Jackson,
where it held that the equal protection clause prohibited a state court from
awarding damages for breach of contract against a signor of a racially restrictive
covenant who nonetheless had sold his property to African-Americans.
Though both Shelley and Barrows involved racially restrictive covenants, there
are two significant differences between the two cases that support the
conclusion that Barrows represents an extension of Shelley. First, Shelley had held
injunctive relief to constitute state action, and the award of injunctive relief
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plausibly could be said to involve more action on behalf of the court than the
award of monetary damages. Second, Shelley had disallowed judicial
enforcement against innocent third parties (the African-Americans who had
sought to purchase property) whereas Barrows disallowed judicial enforcement
against one of the covenantors. Indeed, it was on the basis of this latter
distinction that Chief Justice Vinson, the author of Shelley, dissented in Barrows.
There are a handful of other Supreme Court cases that sometimes are
treated by scholars as applications of the Shelley principle. Careful analysis of
these cases, however, reveals that they were decided on different grounds than
Shelley. Indeed, that the Court systematically has refused to analyze fact
patterns very similar to Shelley’s by means of Shelley’s analytics suggests that
these case manifest a pattern of Supreme Court resistance to extending Shelley.
i. Charitable Trusts. Consider first the 1966 case of Evans v.
Newton, where the Supreme Court ruled that land that had been conveyed in
a will in charitable trust to Macon, Georgia for the creation of a public park for
the exclusive use of white people could not constitutionally be operated on that
basis. Newton could be construed as an extension of Shelley insofar as the mere
fact that the racial restriction was laid down in a “private” will did not insulate
the city’s implementation of the will from constitutional scrutiny. Legal
scholars frequently discuss Evans v. Newton in conjunction with Shelley.
Newton is best understood, however, as having been decided on the
different ground that “the public character of [the park] requires that it be
treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth
Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state law.” Notably, the
majority opinion in Newton did not cite to Shelley. Subsequent Supreme Court
decisions likewise refer to Newton in terms of the “public function” principle,
not as an application of Shelley.
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence that the Court did not
understand Newton in terms of the Shelley principle can be found in the
successor case of Evans v. Abney, which analyzed the constitutionality of
Macon’s response to the Newton decision. After Newton was decided, Georgia
state courts held that the trust became impossible of accomplishment and
hence, under operation of law, was terminated and reverted back to the estate.
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The Supreme Court in Evans v. Abney upheld this reversion. Commentators
understandably have found it “difficult to discern how a court’s enforcement
of a restrictive covenant is state action but a court’s enforcement of a
reversionary clause in a will is not.” Under a Shelley analysis, after all, state
court application of a law that had the effect of excluding Blacks on the basis
of privately devised racial restrictions should have triggered the Equal
Protection Clause. A careful analysis of Abney shows, however, that the Court
relied solely on the “public function” conception of state action found in
Newton when it upheld the reversionary clause. The Court’s holding in Abney
thus suggests that the Court did not understand Shelley to mean that judicial
involvement with private action renders that private action attributable to the
state for purposes of the state action doctrine. Though the Court in Abney did
not explicitly articulate its understanding of Shelley’s principle, Abney’s holding
suggests a narrowing of Shelley’s principle, even in the context of racial
discrimination.
There have been other Supreme Court cases that also concerned
judicial enforcement of racially restrictive wills, and the Court eschewed
reliance on Shelley’ principle in these cases as well. Consider the case of
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. The Board of Directors of City Trusts of City of
Philadelphia. Girard College was established pursuant to a testamentary will
that by its terms disallowed attendance by African-Americans. When the
United States Supreme Court found the operation of Girard College to be
unconstitutional, it cited to Brown v. Board of Education, not Shelley, explaining
that “[t]he Board which operates Girard College is an agency of the State of
Pennsylvania. Therefore, even though the Board was acting as a trustee, its
refusal to admit [African-American candidates] to the college because they were
Negroes was discrimination by the State.” Akin to the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the segregated public park that had been established pursuant to
testamentary devise in Macon in the Newton case, the Supreme Court found
state action not on the ground that the state was enforcing a private
discriminatory will, but because the state was providing a public service when
it implemented the charitable trust. In another case, the Court confronted a
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testamentary trust that created Briar College and limited admittance to “white
girls and young women.” It had been argued in federal district court that the
enforcement of this racial stipulation constituted unlawful state action under
Shelley – a straightforward application of Shelley. After the lower federal
abstained from hearing the merits, the Supreme Court reversed, “remand[ing]
for consideration on the merits.” What is significant for present purposes is
that the Court did not cite to Shelley, but instead cited to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
ii.
The Sit-in Cases. The Court’s effort to contain Shelley’s
principle also can be seen in the sit-in cases of the 1960s. In the first case,
Peterson v. City of Greenville, African-Americans had been arrested for violating
a racially neutral trespass statute when they refused to leave the lunch counter
at a department store in Greenville, South Carolina. In addition to the trespass
ordinance, the city also had a law that proscribed restaurants from serving
blacks and whites together. Although the defendants had been arrested on the
basis of Greenville’s trespass statute, and despite the fact that the city argued
that the department store’s management would have asked the black patrons
to leave even if there had not been a segregation ordinance, the Court not
unreasonably concluded that the convictions “had the effect . . . of enforcing
the [segregation] ordinance.” The Court accordingly concluded that the
convictions “enforce[d] the discrimination mandated by” the city’s segregation
ordinance, and for that reason ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Peterson Court hence did not have to make use of Shelley’s attribution principle
to impute private discrimination to the state because the segregation ordinance
itself uncontroversially constituted state action.
Subsequent sit-in cases posed considerably harder questions because
the government’s role was more attenuated. For example, in Lombard v.
Louisiana, a companion case to Peterson, African-Americans were arrested
under a state criminal mischief statute for refusing to vacate a refreshment
counter per the restaurant manager’s request. In Lombard, there was no statute
or ordinance that proscribed integration. In the absence of state or city
regulation that could qualify as state action, an obvious approach to locating
state action would have been to invoke Shelley’s attribution rationale so that the
manager’s discriminatory intent would be applied to the police and judiciary
that were enforcing his discriminatory desires. Indeed, such a Shelley analysis
is precisely what Justice Douglas advocated in his concurring opinion.
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Notably, the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren declined to find state
action by means of Shelley attribution, but found state action in the Mayor’s
warning that demonstrators would be arrested pursuant to general laws against
disturbing the peace or creating disturbances on private property. The Court
treated these words of the Mayor “exactly as if [the city] had an ordinance
prohibiting . . . desegregated service in restaurants.” The point for present
purposes is not to decide whether Lombard’s reasoning is plausible, but to
highlight that the Court quite clearly elected to avoid reaching its result by
applying Shelley.
The Court’s reluctance to extend Shelley is most striking in the case of
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. The facts in Kress were similar to the earlier
decided cases, but with one essential difference: there were no express
ordinances or statements by law enforcement officials concerning segregation.
There hence was no readily apparent positive state law to which the
restauranteur’s refusal to serve the plaintiff could be connected. Under such
circumstances, Shelley’s attribution rationale was the most conspicuous
precedential approach for locating state action. Though the Kress Court was
not unaware of Shelley – indeed, the Court referenced Shelley numerous times
during the course of its opinion – Kress eschewed Shelley’s analytics. Rather
than applying Shelley to find state action by attributing the restauranteur’s
discrimination to the state, the Kress Court purported to locate affirmative
discriminatory regulation on the part of the state: “[f]or state action purposes
it makes no difference of course whether the racially discriminatory act by the
private party is compelled by a statutory provision or by a custom having the
force of law – in either case it is the State that has commanded the result by its
law.” This is radical: custom – the norms and decisions of private individuals
– is actually being accorded the status of state law. Kress’s analysis eliminated
the very predicate for Shelley’s approach: the private party’s discriminatory
decision need not be attributed to the state by means of judicial enforcement,
but instead the private individuals’ discriminatory practices themselves are
reconstituted as discriminatory state law itself. The Court’s decision not to
ground its holding in Shelley’s approach could not have been clearer.
Kress’s analysis is the most striking example, but all the sit-in cases share
a common analytic approach that bespeaks the Court’s uneasiness with
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extending Shelley: the Court found state action in these cases by purporting to
locate state policies that “compelled the act” of refusing to serve Blacks, not
in the Shelley modality of attributing private discriminatory decisions (in this
case, of the restauranteurs) to the state when the state enforces facially neutral
laws. That the Court consistently refused to extend Shelley’s approach in
circumstances analogous to Shelley’s definitively establishes the Court’s
reluctance to utilize Shelley’s approach even in race discrimination cases.
b.
Lower court decisions. The lower court decisions
discussed above in Part I.B.1 are representative of the vast majority of cases in
which courts have refused to extend Shelley. As this subsection shows,
however, there are some rare instances where courts have applied Shelley. Like
their counterparts refusing to extend Shelley, the reasoning found in these
decisions is inadequate. The decisions do not locate a principled end point that
would preserve the public/private distinction. Furthermore, the handful of
decisions extending Shelley cite to Shelley without explaining how they fit into
the large body of post-Shelley case law that has limited Shelley’s principle.
An early case applying Shelley’s attribution principle is the 1966 decision
of Spencer v. Flint Memorial Park Association. The plaintiff had purchased burial
rights in a cemetery, subject to the condition that only Whites should be buried
there. Plaintiff sought to bury an African-American, and at issue in the Spencer
case was whether the state court could enforce the racially restrictive
contractual provision. The Michigan appellate court ruled that enforcement
would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that Shelley’s principle
applied to “cemetery lots to the same extent that such analysis applies to more
conventional property interest.” The state court made it “absolutely clear that
such conclusion in no way prevents cemeteries maintained by a particular
religious faith from restricting burial rights to members of that faith.” Deeply
troubling, however, is the court’s failure to explain why the judicial
enforcement of religious conditions were constitutionally different from the
judicial enforcement of racial conditions.
One field where it may at first appear that courts have applied Shelley’s
principle, even outside the context of racial discrimination, is testamentary
restrictions. Although courts in many instances have enforced religious-based
testamentary conditions, courts in some other jurisdictions have ruled that the
enforcement of trusts that discriminate on the basis of race and gender
constitutes state action in violation of the Constitution. In In re Crichfield Trust,
for example, a New Jersey court found it necessary to reformulate a trust that
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had established a yearly college scholarship for “worthy boys of Summit High
School” so that the trust benefitted all worthy graduates, regardless of gender.
Citing to Shelley, the court held that “[t]he involvement of the court itself in
supervising and directing the administration of a charitable trust is state
action.” A federal district court similarly held that “[t]he State cannot require
compliance with [a racial] testamentary restriction because that would
constitute State action barred by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
While the language in these decisions certainly suggests that these
courts’ holdings simply are contrary to the religious-based testamentary
conditions, all of these cases involved charitable trusts in which state
administration of the trust resulted in the provision of services to the public.
State administration of the trust hence had the appearance of the government
providing services to the public, thereby bringing the cases under the well
established “public functions” component of the state action doctrine. Two of
the cases involved land granted for the purpose of creating public colleges,
and the other two involved trusts for college scholarships to be awarded
graduates of public high schools. So, for example, Virginia’s implementation
of the will of Fletcher Williams, which established the Sweet Briar College,
required that applications from those who were not “white girls and young
women” had to be rejected, and implementation of the will of Stephen Girard
meant that a Board of Trusts, which had been created by the state of
Pennsylvania to run Girard College, had to refuse admission to all Black
candidates. Implementation of the will of Frieda Crichfield meant that the
Board of Education of the city of Summit could not award a college
scholarship to girls graduating from the public high school, and implementing
the Wright will similarly meant that only boys graduating from Keene High
School were eligible for a college scholarship. It is quite possible that the
“public functions” component of these cases (i.e., that the state’s
implementation of these wills required that they provide services similar to
those ordinarily provided by government) played a role in the courts’
decisions, as was true when the Supreme Court held Philadelphia’s operation
of Girard College to be unconstitutional and similarly struck down the city of
Macon’s operation of a racially segregated park.
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There are only a handful of other reported cases where courts have
applied the Shelley principle. A few older cases cited to Shelley and ruled that
judicial enforcement of non-racial restrictive covenants constituted state
action. Though there are not a sufficient number of cases to identify a clear
pattern, the case law to date suggests that courts have been more apt to find
state action when confronted by restrictions that disallow particular classes of
persons or groups from living in a place. For example, some courts have found
state action when asked to enforce restrictions excluding children or that have
the effect of barring houses of worship. Virtually all courts, however, have
ruled that judicial enforcement of these types of restrictions regarding the use
of property do not constitute state action. Unfortunately, none of these court
decisions has provided a principled defense of its rule that attempts to explain
how its holding fits with the pattern of post-Shelley jurisprudence. The cases
finding state action cite only to Shelley without explaining whether their
approach threatens the stability of the public/private distinction, whereas the
cases finding no state action tend to limit Shelley to the racial context without
explaining why there should be such a context-specific constitutional rule.
There is one context where courts uniformly have applied the Shelley
principle. American courts that have been asked to enforce foreign judgments
that are based on foreign laws that could not have been enacted by an
American polity due to the Constitution have concluded that it would be
unconstitutional for them to enforce such foreign judgments. For instance,
British defamation law is more pro-plaintiff than the First Amendment allows
American defamation law to be. When asked to enforce British defamation
judgments, these courts have cited to Shelley and concluded that enforcing such
judgments would constitute state action in which the substantive content of the
legal restriction would be attributed to the court. These courts all have
neglected to take account of the post-Shelley case law. If enforcing the foreign
judgment constitutes state action even though the substantive law governing
the parties’ relationship had not been created by an American polity, what
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would their reasoning suggest about the enforceability of settlement
agreements or private contracts in which individuals agree to limit their speech?
Are these courts of the view that all the cases that have upheld the
enforceability of such agreements were mistakenly decided? It is unlikely they
would so conclude, but one cannot be certain because these courts have not
sought to explain how their holdings fit with the post-Shelley case law.
3.
Summary Regarding the Post-Shelley case law. Shelley’s
attribution rationale has not fared well. With only one exception, the Supreme
Court has not extend Shelley’s principle, even in other racial contexts. Lower
courts almost uniformly have refused to extend Shelley, but instead regularly
enforce private agreements whose substantive terms would trigger
constitutional review if they had been enacted by an American polity. Only a
handful of lower court opinions have applied Shelley’s principle. The largest set
of such cases, those concerning state enforcement of restrictive testamentary
gifts, are explainable on alternative grounds. With regard to non-racial
restrictive covenants and foreign judgments, the other contexts where Shelley
has been applied, courts have cited to Shelley without considering how their
holdings comported with the post-Shelley case law and without locating a
principled way of rescuing the public/private distinction. The cases limiting
Shelley are not immune from criticism either: while many have well explained
Shelley’s threat to the distinction between public and private action, none has
provided a principled justification for why the Shelley rule appropriately applies
only to the racial context. The logic of these cases indicts rather than
vindicates the Court’s holding in Shelley, and the cases are best understood as
attempts to limit Shelley to its facts.
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II.
THE HERETOFORE INADEQUATE SCHOLARLY EFFORTS AT
RECONCEPTUALIZING SHELLEY
To date, the scholarly explanations of Shelley fall into two broad camps.
A small band of scholars understands Shelley’s problematic analytics as a
reflection of inherent weakness of the public/private distinction and
accordingly advocates the distinction’s elimination, arguing that constitutional
limitations ought to apply not just to government but to individuals as well.
All other scholars have sought to provide an alternative justification for Shelley
that grounds the decision in the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner that
preserves the public/private distinction. While many of the justifications
offered by scholars in the second camp are quite ingenious, none enjoys
widespread acceptance. This Part II first explains why explanations of Shelley
that rely on rejecting the public/private distinction should be eschewed. It
then shows that the second camp’s explanations all have significant analytical
shortcomings. Perhaps surprisingly, many of the scholars’ explanations actually
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support the non-Fourteenth Amendment approach to Shelley that this Article
identifies and defends in Parts III and IV.
A. Rejecting the public/private distinction. One approach to rationalizing
Shelley that has been embraced by a small group of esteemed scholars –
including Professors Chemerinsky, Berman, and Kay – is to invoke the
decision as evidence that the distinction between public and private is
“incoherent,” as legal realists and other critics have argued for generations.
Reconceptualizing Shelley in this respect – as a decision that confirms
the unsoundness of the public/private distinction – is problematic because
maintaining the public/private distinction is desirable. This section explains the
shortcomings of the critics’ rejection of the public/private distinction and the
state action doctrine. Contrary to the critics’ claims, the distinction between
private and public action is not illogical, but instead reflects cultural values.
The longstanding resilience of the public/private distinction despite
generations of critique suggests that the distinction reflects deeply grounded
American cultural values, which this section then identifies. The twin facts that
the distinction is not illogical and that it reflects deep American values jointly
cast serious doubt on attempts to reconceptualize Shelley in a manner that
jeopardizes the public/private distinction.
The core of the classical critique is that “the state always plays a major
role, implicitly or explicitly, in any legal relationship.” This is because “[a]ll
private actions take place against a background of laws.” For example, law
affirmatively permits activities or implicitly permits them by failing to prohibit
them. Furthermore, “individual choices are strongly influenced by the
context of state-created law.” “Explicit government actions on such things
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as fiscal and monetary policy, licensing of occupations, zoning, and education,
among many other subjects, determine the environment in which individual
decisions are made, and determine, in significant degree, the costs and benefits
of alternative personal choices.” In short, these critics have argued, it makes
no sense to attempt to draw a line between public and private action because
the two are intimately and irreversibly intertwined.
Analysis of the strength of the classical critique of the public/private
distinction must begin with the empirical observation that the distinction has
“survive[d] both as a matter of constitutional doctrine and popular intuition.”
Is the durability of the public/private distinction the regrettable result of courts
having been deaf to logic?
I shall suggest otherwise: the distinction’s
durability reflects an aspect of American culture of which courts and legal
analysts appropriately ought to take account.
First, if we observe the logical end point of the classical critique, we see
that it virtually eliminates the realm of “private,” for practically no laws can be
said to be axiomatic; an alternative rule, or no regulation at all, almost always
is plausible. The classical critique thus suggests that virtually all, if not all,
activity undertaken by a person is appropriately attributed to the state and
hence is properly subjected to constitutional limitations. That this conclusion
likely is startling to most people suggests that the classical critique omits some
relevant considerations.
Indeed it does. What the classical critique neglects can be identified by
means of a two step argument. First, all the classical critique establishes is that
there always is state involvement – what I’ll call “government agency” – in
individuals’ decisionmaking. That there always is some government agency is
only half the story, however, for it still may be meaningful to identify individual
agency. There may be individual agency where the legal consequence of an
individual’s action is the result of the action’s interaction with the law. This is
true even where the law that determines the action’s consequence could have
been different, and where the law is not the choice of the individual, but has
been imposed upon her. To be sure, individuals under such circumstances
have constrained autonomy insofar as they operate subject to a non-axiomatic
set of rules that they have not chosen. Nevertheless, individual agency surely
is present when an individual’s action is deliberate and the person can predict
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how her action will interact with the operative law to produce a result.
An analogy to the physical sciences might be useful to clarify this point.
Under current understandings, the laws of physics are not invariable but are
context dependent; one set of physical principles appears to govern physical
behavior at the atomic and sub-atomic levels (quantum mechanics) whereas
another set of laws (Newtonian mechanics) operates on larger systems.
Similarly, the gravitational force to which people are subject is greater on the
Earth than in space. Most people would not conclude from this that a person
who jumped into the air while she was on Earth, resulting in her rapid return
to the ground on account of the force of gravity to which she was subject, did
not act autonomously because the physical laws that govern the consequences
of her actions are only one among at least two possible sets of laws (such that
if she had jumped “up” from her space craft while she were in space she would
have continued to travel upward). Rather, we typically attribute human agency
to the decision of a person to act in accordance with non-axiomatic physical
laws to which she is subject when the physical laws are known such that the
consequence of her action is readily predictable.
Second, advocates of the classical critique typically believe that erasing
the distinction between public and private action ineluctably follows from the
understanding that government agency always is present.
The critics’
conclusion, however, is based on a contestable jurisprudential position. Their
conclusion rests on the premise that it is jurisprudentially unfounded as an a
priori matter to utilize a binary characterization scheme (e.g., one that asks: is
it private or public?) when the object being categorized has elements of both.
The critics assume that sharp legal categories are appropriate only when
working with “pure” objects that are readily fit into only one or the other
category.
The critics’ underlying jurisprudence asks too much of law. Our world
is complex, and seldom if ever is the reality that the law seeks to characterize
wholly pure in composition. At the same time, law by its nature is a social
institution that seeks to simplify decisionmaking and action-taking by
identifying as legally relevant only a handful of the infinite considerations that
characterize any given circumstance. As a result of these two things – the
reductive nature of law and the complex character of life – there seldom if ever
are circumstances where a given legal category is coterminous with a pure
reality in the world. Rather, reality is complex, and legal categories simplify
analysis by shoe-horning complex phenomena into simplified categories.
Doing so is bound to distort reality; that is, an item identified as “x” almost
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always will also have some “non-x” characteristics.
This does not mean that all legal questions are “hard.” What typically
makes a legal question “not hard” is not that a legal category corresponds to a
pure reality, but that a given situation is most plausibly characterized one way
or the other. What determines whether a given situation is “most plausibly
characterized” one way or the other is not logic but judgment. The mere fact
that subjective judgment is involved, however, does not mean that the
judgment necessarily will be controversial. The judgment is a product of the
socially constructed intuitions, values, and ideology that constitutes a culture.
To the extent there is a rich and widely shared culture, it is to be expected that
there will be widespread agreement as regards many if not most judgments.
It is at this point that the endurance of the public/private distinction
becomes analytically relevant. Because one always can locate an aspect of
government agency in respect of any activity that a person undertakes insofar
as some polity could have proscribed it, the approach taken by Shelley cannot
be said to be illogical. As discussed above, however, one also can meaningfully
speak of individual agency where the end result of a person’s action is function
of the action’s interaction with non-axiomatic laws. We thus are presented
with a situation where there is an admixture of government and individual
agency. As shown above, American case law has concluded that the
component of individual agency virtually always predominates in the context
of judicial enforcement contracts entered into by private citizens. This
conclusion is not logically necessary, but nor does it violate logic. Rather, the
conclusion is a reflection of commonly held American political cultural values.
Accordingly, the type of argument that critics of the public/private
distinction must advance is not one of logic but normativity: for instance, they
must convince people that a court’s enforcement of a contract is more
plausibly construed as state action than a vindication of private ordering. I am
skeptical that the critics can succeed in convincing many people of this.
Several contemporary critics of the public/private distinction appear to agree
that their arguments are not likely to sway the masses, and that the
public/private distinction is here to stay. With this I concur. But to the extent
these contemporary critics’ conclusions rest on the belief that the distinction’s
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resilience reflects a lack of analytical clarity on the part of the general public,
I object. Rather, the distinction’s durability reflects values that are an
important part of our country’s larger political culture.
To see this, it is necessary to identify the cultural values behind the
distinction. Judicial opinions have identified three benefits. The first concerns
autonomy: maintaining the distinction retains a larger sphere for individuals
to order their lives as they so choose. For example, the distinction allows for
sectarian private schools in a constitutional culture in which public schools
cannot advance sectarian religious education. The expanded range of options
that can be found as a result of the public/private distinction has cascading
autonomy consequences. For instance, the distinction allows for a broader
array of social institutions, such as sectarian schools that teach religion and
create distinctive social environments. Parents accordingly have a richer cluster
of options among which they can choose, expanding their effective autonomy.
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commitments.
The second and third standard reasons courts have proffered to justify
the distinction between public and private – separation of powers and
federalism considerations – reflect the democratic ideal of limiting the scope
of the judiciary so as to retain space for democratic politics. In a jurisprudential
world in which there are hearty federal constitutional doctrines and a strong
version of judicial review, the absence of a strong distinction between public
and private would dramatically increase the power of courts in relation to the
other branches of the federal government and the states. Activities currently
treated as “private” and not subject to Fourteenth Amendment limitations
generally may be regulated by Congress or the states. Erasing the distinction
between public and private would extend the scope of judicially determined
constitutional constraints and accordingly limit the scope of federal and state
legislative power. This could have all sorts of pernicious effects, including,
paradoxically, inhibiting the evolution of culture insofar as democratic politics
and our federal system may provide a better opportunity for the gradual
modification of societal consensuses than does judicial imposition of policies
that are counter to a contemporary popular consensus.
In short, the critics of the public/private distinction bear the burden of
remaking critical aspects of our country’s political culture. Popular opposition
to erasing the public/private distinction and making all contract claims (for
example) subject to constitutional limitations is not illogical, for both individual
agency and state agency are present in the making and enforcement of all
contracts. The widespread tendency to view contracts as belonging to the
“private” realm reflects deeply held American cultural values that favor
protecting individual autonomy against all-encompassing governmental
regulation and preserving room for democratic politics by limiting the role of
courts. That the public/private distinction is not illogical and that it reflects
deeply held cultural values are two strong justifications for resisting a
reconceptualization of Shelley that jettisons the state action doctrine. (In any
event, the analysis that follows in Parts III and IV may be convincing even to
one who holds the view that the public/private distinction is analytically
unsound; after all, rejection of the distinction is not inconsistent with the
possibility that Shelley can be solidly justified on grounds outside of the
Fourteenth Amendment.)
B. Preserving the public/private distinction. Almost all scholars who
have analyzed Shelley have sought to identify a limiting principle that preserves
the distinction between public and private action. These scholarly approaches
can be usefully grouped into three categories: (1) those that limit Shelley on the
basis of the substantive content of the contractual right, (2) those that
understand Shelley as inviting a balancing test, and (3) those that limit Shelley to
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the context of racial discrimination.
The analysis that follows shows that each of these scholarly approaches
to rationalizing Shelley encounters significant analytical obstacles. Further,
while differing in important details, the scholarly approaches taken to date
share two crucial characteristics. First, all conceptualize Shelley as having
articulated a constitutional rule growing out of the Fourteenth Amendment –
which is not surprising, of course, insofar as the Shelley Court did the same.
Second, the proposals implicitly reject the notion that state action is a transsubstantive principle. Instead, each of these scholars concludes that
determining whether enforcement triggers constitutional scrutiny turns on
highly context-sensitive analysis. As Part IV shows, this shared scholarly
conclusion constitutes strong support for this Article’s effort to reconceptualize
Shelley as a Thirteenth-Amendment based decision: the highly context-sensitive
analysis identified by the scholars is best undertaken by courts in conjunction
with legislative and executive involvement, and the Thirteenth Amendment
approach introduced in this Article invites such coordinate branch participation
whereas the Fourteenth Amendment approach does not.
1.
Substantive Content of the Contract Right. An early,
influential article by Professor Thomas Lewis argued that Shelley was correctly
decided because “the common law of the state functioned to delegate zoning
power to private parties.” Lewis thought that restrictive covenants were
“peculiarly akin to sovereign powers ” and hence properly subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment. A notable difficulty with Lewis’ approach is
determining what private actions are sufficiently akin to sovereign powers to
trigger constitutional scrutiny. Professor Lewis thought restrictive covenants
qualified because covenants that ran with the land restricted land use even
“beyond the period of ownership of the land by any of the parties initiating the
restriction.” Yet corporations and charitable trusts similarly allow a party to
determine how property is to be used even after that party no longer owns the
property. Are these also to be subject to Fourteenth Amendment limitations?
That Professor Lewis equivocates on these questions – he suggests that
although “the Constitution does not demand equation between state and
corporation or state and charity,” Fourteenth Amendment limitations might
properly attach to some of these entities’ activities – betrays the contextsensitive analysis his proposal requires. It also suggests that Lewis has not
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identified satisfactory criteria for distinguishing between private and public
activity.
2. Balancing Proposals. Two of the best known approaches
to rationalizing Shelley advocate that the decision should be understood as
licensing courts to undertake a “balancing” of competing considerations to
determine when judicial enforcement of a contract appropriately triggers
constitutional review. In a famous article, Professor Henkin argued that the
phrase state action does not “contribute[] to clarity,” but instead suggested that
the Fourteenth Amendment appropriately applies when “the state is responsible
for a denial of rights.” Henkin proposed two interlocking principles for
deciding when the state is appropriately deemed “responsible” for “enforcing
private discrimination.” First the state is responsible only when it could have
proscribed the discrimination. Second, Henkin argues, though the state
almost always has the power to proscribe the private discrimination, there are
a “few” circumstances under which the state is without power to do this,
namely, when the constitutional rights of liberty and property “that remain[] in
the due process clause” outweigh the constitutional right of equal protection.
Henkin’s approach is subject to several criticisms. First, it leaves very
little room for “private” action; the substantive due process rights to liberty and
property that define the scope of enforceable contracts is vanishingly small, as
Henkin himself recognized. Indeed, there is little functional difference
between Henkin’s approach and the classical critique of the public/private
distinction discussed above; the classical critique, it should be recalled, rejected
the distinction because the government could have proscribed the “private”
activities, but this logic dissolves the public/private distinction only with regard
to those matters over which the government potentially could have regulated.
Henkin’s argument accordingly is subject to the same criticisms leveled above
against the classical critique. Relatedly, Henkin’s approach is inconsistent with
the case law insofar as courts continue to enforce such things as contractual
limitations on speech.
Second, to the extent that Henkin leaves space for private action, the
process he proposes for defining that space is highly context-dependent and
resists the principled application that is institutionally appropriate for courts.
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Henkin acknowledges that the conflict between competing constitutional
commitments “can only be decided in the light of a complex of considerations
of varying import and relevance.” So, for instance, Henkin tentatively
concludes that although “a state cannot prevent an individual from leaving
property to A rather than B, both strangers, even if the reason is that A is white
and B a Negro, . . . the state can prevent a testator from leaving property to a
private institution, nonreligious in character, which practices religious or racial
discrimination.”
More generally, Henkin embraces a jurisprudence of
“balancing” the competing liberty and equality interests, a methodology that
Henkin himself later argued was not susceptible to principled application.
Henkin’s later writings with regard to balancing’s pitfalls are persuasive. The
way in which competing constitutional commitments are balanced or
harmonized is a highly subjective process that simultaneously reflects and
defines the decisionmaker’s very character. For this reason, a doctrinal
approach that assigns such decisionmaking exclusively to courts – as Henkin’s
Fourteenth Amendment approach does – is undesirable. As I argue at length
below, there are strong reasons to prefer a doctrinal approach that invites the
participation of the more political branches of government in respect of this
type of decisionmaking process.
Fifteen years after Professor Henkin’s article, Professors Glennon and
Nowak put forward yet another balancing proposal that purported to
rationalize Shelley (as well as the Court’s other state action decisions). Their
famous article launched a frontal assault on the notion that the quantum of
state involvement explains the doctrine of state action. They instead argued
that the state action doctrine is invoked where there is a “battle for supremacy
between the asserted rights of private persons,” and that what really drives the
Court’s state action decisionmaking is determining whether an individual’s
activity undermines another person’s rights to such a degree that the
Constitution is appropriately triggered. In their view, the state action doctrine
is actually a “balancing process that weighs the value of a challenged
nongovernmental practice against the harm it does to a given right and the
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value of that asserted right.” The state action doctrine appropriately asks, in
their view, whether the “actions of [a] person so endanger fundamental
constitutional values that they are prohibited by the Amendment.”
There are important difficulties with Glennon and Nowak’s approach.
First, though their argument purports to protect the state action doctrine, at its
core it is a denial of the constitutional significance of the distinction between
governmental and individual action; after all, in their view, any “nongovernmental
practice” is properly subject to constitutional limitations so long as the
practice sufficiently “impairs certain fundamental [constitutional] values.”
The rejection of the public/private divide that Glennon and Nowak embrace
is not as thoroughgoing as either Henkin’s or that of the classical critique, but
it nonetheless is a square rejection of the notion that private activity is beyond
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s proscriptions. Glennon and
Nowak’s thesis accordingly is subject to the criticisms leveled above against the
classical critique.
Second, Glennon and Nowak’s analysis begs the question of the
constitutional source of the constitutional prohibitions they defend. In essence
they embrace the view that constitutional provisions include prophylactic
measures that themselves have a constitutional status; they argue, after all, that
activities by nongovernmental entities that “endanger fundamental
constitutional values” themselves are unconstitutional. Even if constitutional
values require prophylactic protections to be effective, however, it does not
logically follow that the prophylactic measures themselves have the status of
constitutional law. What, after all, is the source of the Court’s power to make
a prophylactic rule of constitutional authority? To this day, the Supreme Court
has not answered this question. A plausible alternative not considered by
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whether the Miranda decision announced a prophylactic rule and, if it did, what was the source of the
Court’s authority to do so. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA . L. REV. 1, 28
(2004) (noting this).
150
See Berman, supra note 100, 149, at 28-30. The question of the source, legitimacy, and status of
prophylactic rules has received extensive discussion in the academic literature. See id. at 20-32. Though
the Court still has not directly answered these questions concerning prophylactic rules, Professor David
Strauss’ view – that “‘prophylactic’ rules are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy, but are
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Glennon and Nowak’s analysis is that court-fashioned prophylactic measures
have the status of federal common law.
In addition to its significance in respect of determining the prophylaxis’
legitimacy, the precise status of the prophylaxis has crucial institutional
implications: whereas federal common law can be displaced by Congress, the
general view is that Court-articulated constitutional rules may not. In today’s
world of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, Glennon and
Nowak’s approach thus allocates the responsibility for creating prophylactic
rules exclusively to courts. This is unfortunate for several reasons. First, the
highly inexact nature of the balancing process that Glennon and Nowak
identify as lying at the core of their prophylactic conception of the state action
doctrine is a decisionmaking process that is highly subjective and that both
reflects and constitutes the character of the entity that decides how the
competing constitutional interests are to be harmonized – highly subjective,
political decisionmaking processes well suited to the more political branches of
government. The involvement of the legislative and executive branches is also
desirable because prophylactic rules by their nature are practical tools whose
design is appropriately informed by circumstances that may change over time
or social science that becomes more refined over time; Congress and the
executive branch are better situated than courts to take account of such factors
and to alter the prophylactic rules as circumstances change and as scientific
knowledge advances. For all these reasons, the more political branches properly
play a role in the formulation of prophylactic rules.
3. Discrimination. Several other scholarly approaches seek
to limit Shelley’s approach to the context of discrimination. An early effort at
reconceptualizing Shelley, which was advanced by Judge (then Professor) Louis
Pollak, suggested that state action was present only when judicial enforcement
would require discrimination – on the basis of racial, religious or other
“prejudices” that a person might hold – by a person who did not wish to
151
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a central and necessary feature of constitutional law,” David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988) – has been accepted by most scholars. See Berman, supra note 100,
149, at 23 & n. 76. Even so, the prophylactic rules that Strauss and others deem to be central features of
constitutional law are different in kind from the type of prophylaxis embraced by Glennon and Nowak:
whereas Strauss and others justify the Court’s promulgation of legal tests that disallow activities that
themselves may not be unconstitutional, Glennon and Nowak’s approach to state action licenses the
application of constitutional limitations to parties not actually subject to the Constitution’s constraints.
151
See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1975).
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See id.
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See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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David Currie’s critique of Henkin’s approach would appear to be equally applicable here. See CURRIE ,
supra note 135, at 359 & n. 176.
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See Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.1030, 1060 (2001). For a general discussion concerning
prophylactic rules that bears on the discussion above in text, see Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong
Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1596-1601 (2005).
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For more on this point, see supra Part IV.G.
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discriminate. Pollak’s approach required analysis both of the nature of the
legal right and the type of judicial enforcement that was sought. Under this
view, Shelley was correctly decided because enforcing the racial covenant would
have prevented a willing seller from selling his home to African-Americans.
There are deep problems with Pollak’s suggested approach. Professor
Louis Henkin rightly assailed the notion that the presence of state action is a
function of the mental state of individuals. Another oddity of Pollak’s view
is that there would be no state action when courts enforce restrictive covenants
on behalf of persons who want to discriminate. Finally, Pollak’s approach
threatened to significantly erode the public/private distinction, for much of the
time discriminatory contracts would be unenforceable. For instance, Pollak
argues that although “an employer may freely contract with a union to maintain
a lily-white shop, . . . the provision is one which fails whenever” the employer
wishes to hire an African-American because “the union cannot coerce
compliance through an injunction or an award of damages.” Because the
real-world value of unenforceable contractual provisions is negligible, Pollack’s
approach in effect extends constitutional limitations to private contractual
relations with regard to matters of discrimination (racial, religious, and
otherwise ), for all such provisions would be frequently unenforceable under
Pollak’s approach.
Several other scholars have sought to confine Shelley’s rule more
narrowly still to the context of race discrimination. Professor Tribe has argued
that enforcement of the racial covenant was racially discriminatory because
restraints on alienation typically were unenforceable under common law. The
implication of Tribe’s argument is that it would have been perfectly
constitutional to enforce racially restrictive covenants if states generally
enforced restraints on alienation. The unattractiveness of this implication is
evidence of the explanation’s weakness. Moreover, the factual predicate of
Tribe’s argument is questionable: many restraints on alienation were enforced
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Louis Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
13-15 (1959). Justice Black took this approach in Bell v. Md, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), and Chief Justice
Vinson, who authored Shelley, took a similar approach in his dissent in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249
(1953) (arguing that Shelley “dealt only with a state court’s attempt to enforce [restrictive covenants]
directly against innocent third parties . . .).
158
Henkin, supra note 129.
159
Pollak acknowledges that, under his approach, a purchaser of a lot in a private cemetery that limited
interment to Caucasians could not sue in court under the Fourteenth Amendment to compel the cemetery
to bury an African-American. See id. at 14 & n. 57. Similarly, a homeowner could refuse to allow an
African-American into her house simply because she was an African-American, and the police could
enforce the laws of trespass on her behalf, without triggering the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 14.
160
See Pollak, supra note 157, at 13.
161
A further complication with Pollak’s approach is determining what precisely is encompassed within the
term “discrimination,” though his description is helpful: “the line sought to be drawn is that beyond
which the state assists a private person in seeing to it that others behave in a fashion which the state could
not itself have ordained.” Id. at 13.
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LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 260 (1985).
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David Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 968 (1989).
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at the time.
Other scholars also have tried to justify Shelley as a race-specific holding.
Professor David Strauss has argued that “much private action was for all
practical purposes indistinguishable from government action” in the Jim Crow
South because discrimination was the result of a complex interaction between
both the private and public systems. Consequently, Strauss concludes, “it
d[id] not make a lot of sense to distinguish between state action and private
action.” In a similar vein, Professor Carol Rose has sought to justify Shelley
on the basis of race:
164

165

166

we could easily interpret Shelley’s watchword of “judicial enforcement
as state action” as something that is intimately connected to the law
of property, and to property law’s insistence that ownership rights
and obligations fall into easily anticipated patterns – patterns that are
relatively simple and limited, and that a court can justifiably regard
as having some more than idiosyncratic value for landowners . . .
[Racially restrictive covenants]concerned not the occupants’ land
uses, but rather the occupants themselves, and their value rested critically
on the culture and customs of prejudice against those occupants.
167

Drawing on the norms literature, which understands that “norms and customs
may be so widespread and so powerful that they have the practical force of
law,” Rose argues that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
would have been tantamount to judicial enforcement of norms that for all
practical purposes have the force of law.
The authors of a leading
constitutional law casebook similarly explain Shelley as a race-specific decision,
suggesting that “state action questions in race cases should be resolved by
overall considerations of equal protection, rather than by some unified theory
of state action that applies to all cases, including those outside the equal
protection arena.”
Professor Strauss’ and Professor Rose’s explanations are powerful
indeed, but they too are not immune from strong criticism. Both in effect
resolve Shelley’s public/private conundrum by confessing that the distinction
168
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See Tushnet, supra note 113, at 386-87 & n. 25. Similarly, Carol Rose has identified several state law
doctrines that could have been relied upon to find racially restrictive covenants unenforceable – such as
horizontal privity and touch and concern, the rule against perpetuities, and the doctrine of “changed
circumstances.” See Rose, supra note 128, at 177-94.
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David A. Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 414 (1993).
Professor Strauss does not conclude that today the “private” actions of individuals are not appropriately
subject to constitutional limitations, but sketches a novel approach under which activities that are the joint
result of governmental and individual action may be subjected to looser constitutional limitations than
typically are applied to pure governmental action. See id. at 418-20; cf. Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly
Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005).
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Strauss, supra note 163, at 412.
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Rose, supra note 128, at 198 (emphasis supplied).
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Id. at 48-49.
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DANIEL A. FARBER , WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 224 (3rd ed. 2003).
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was irrelevant, at least at that time and in that context. These explanations
hence confront the doctrinal obstacle that the Court’s jurisprudence at all times
has maintained the significance of the public/private distinction in the
Fourteenth Amendment. There are more problems still. Two functional
explanations Professor Strauss provides fall short of justifying the disregard of
the public/private distinction he advocates. Strauss explicitly defends Shelley
on the basis that expanding state action by disregarding the public/private
distinction “was a way of bypassing Congress; it was functionally equivalent to
getting a range of civil rights legislation enacted before Congress was willing to
do so.” To begin, the factual predicate behind Strauss’ analysis is absent in
respect of Shelley because, as this Article argues in Part III, there were federal
statutes that addressed racially restrictive covenants. Second, even if no such
federal statutes had existed, the functional need to which Strauss points does
not justify the creation of a constitutional rule because (as Part III also argues) the
same result could have been brought about as a matter of federal common law.
In short, the existence of non-constitutional solutions undermines Strauss’
functional defense of Shelley’s constitutional ruling.
******************************
These, then, are among the most famous scholarly efforts to
reconceptualize Shelley. The efforts to rationalize Shelley while retaining the
1 70
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Indeed, if Professor Rose is correct that the norms and customs of discrimination had the practical
force of law, it is not clear why a determination of unconstitutionality needed to await the effort to judicial
enforce the covenants; the covenants themselves should have been unconstitutional.
171
Professor Strauss apparently would respond that he does not mean to suggest that the Court jettisoned
the state action doctrine and its distinction between public and private, but only that the Court’s approach
in the Shelley era was a “plausible adaptation of the doctrine to particular historical conditions.” Strauss,
supra note 163, at 414. I would respectfully disagree insofar as it seems that the “adaptation” Strauss
advocates is more susceptible to being characterized as a rejection of the public/private distinction that
is the foundation of the state action doctrine.
172
Strauss, supra note 163, at 413. The next sentence in Professor Strauss’ article reads “Shelley v. Kraemer
anticipated the federal open housing laws by more than twenty years . . .” Id.
173
It might be thought that Shelley’s problematic public/private distinction can be remedied by
reconceptualizing it as a case in which the court was enforcing a governmental legal rule that “courts must
enforce contracts.” See generally Rosen, supra note 97, at 209-11 (explaining the approach of Molly S. Van
Houweling, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, the First Amendment, and Internet Speech: Notes for the Next Yahoo!,
24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697, 703-04 (2003), which addressed this analytical issue, though not Shelley in
particular). Any such effort at reworking Shelley would require a radical reconstruction of constitutional
doctrine. Generally applicable rules that have incidental effects on constitutional rights typically do not
generate meaningful constitutional review. This is clearly true of general rules that have incidental effects
on equal protection rights, see, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (subjecting general
governmental rules that disproportionately affect African-Americans to a toothless reasonableness test).
There is no basis for suggesting that general rules that have incidental effects on contract or property
rights would generate meaningful judicial review insofar as direct regulations of these rights typically lead
only to relatively low levels of judicial review. See generally, Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic
Rights and Personal Liberty, 2 CATO SUP. CT . REV . 9, 13-16 (2004). The major exception with regard to
constitutional review of generally applicable laws that impose incidental effects concerns free speech
rights, see Frederick Schauer in Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on
Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 789 (1985) (explaining that time, place and manner
regulations of traditional public fora are a form of constitutional review of incidental effects of general
regulations), which have no application here. Furthermore, it would be highly undesirable to treat a rule
that “courts must enforce contracts” as triggering constitutional scrutiny, for doing so would reproduce
the very dangers of constitutionalizing all private action that Shelley posed. See Rosen, supra note 97, at
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public/private distinction all share four important characteristics: all (1)
understand Shelley as announcing a constitutional rule, (2) assume that the
constitutional rule is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) demand a
highly context-sensitive analysis, and (4) have significant analytic deficiencies.
One might conclude that nearly sixty years of scholarly efforts to generate a
convincing rationale for Shelley means that the effort to find a rationalization
that preserves the public/private distinction should be abandoned, but there
are strong reasons to resist such a reconceptualization of Shelley.
These considerations provide a predicate for the more radical
reconceptualization of Shelley that this Article proposes in Part III.
Furthermore, the benefits to reconceptualizing Shelley as a Thirteenth
Amendment-based decision that are discussed in Part IV shed light on yet
additional disadvantages of the scholarly approaches examined in this Part II.
III.

POSITIVE ANALYSIS: THE CASE FOR RECONCEPTUALIZING SHELLEY
AS A THIRTEENTH AMEND MENT DECISION
Parts I and II showed that the Shelley Court relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment and that subsequent case law and scholarly efforts to narrow
Shelley have remained within the Fourteenth Amendment. The Article’s next
two parts instead seek to situate Shelley’s holding under the Thirteenth
Amendment. As a matter of positive analysis, this Part III elaborates two
plausible Thirteenth Amendment-grounded approaches to Shelley: one based
on federal statute, the other on a form of quasi-federal common law that I dub
“constitutional preemption.” Part IV makes the normative argument for
conceptualizing Shelley in Thirteenth rather than Fourteenth Amendment terms.
A.
The Legitimacy of Reconceptualizing Earlier Decided Cases. Before
arguing how and why Shelley should be reconceptualized, it is necessary to
establish the threshold proposition that reconceptualizing earlier decided cases
is a legitimate form of constitutional argumentation. A full defense of this
proposition is beyond the scope of this Article, for the notion of legitimacy in
respect of constitutionalism itself is an exceedingly complex and contested
subject. A comprehensive discussion also would entail careful consideration
of other intricate topics, including the nature of precedent and stare decisis.
Even a brief discussion, however, can establish the prima facie validity
of reconceptualization. First, no one doubts that the Court has power to
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224-26. Finally, treating the rule that “courts must enforce contracts” as governmental action would be
conceptually problematic. There is a plausible basis for applying constitutional limitations to general
governmental rules that have incidental effects on constitutional rights insofar as the government is the
entity that is regulating the behavior. A rule such as “courts must enforce contracts,” by contrast, does
not directly regulate human activity. For that reason, it is not conceptually sound to attribute the content
of the enforced contract to the government for purposes of the state action doctrine.
174
My use of this term differs from that of Professor Hill, who famously introduced it. See infra note 223.
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Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1789-93 (2005)
with Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 146 (2003).
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See generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1998); Frederick Schauer,
Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
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overrule its precedent under appropriate circumstances, and the
reconceptualization of earlier decided cases can usefully be understood as a
limited form of overruling. Moreover, the reconceptualization of earlier
decided cases is a deeply entrenched aspect of the practice of American
constitutional law. For example, all the scholarly approaches to Shelley
discussed above in Part II.B are efforts to reconceptualize the decision. It is
true that these approaches all remained squarely within the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it cannot be said that this is a sine qua non of legitimacy for
reconceptualizing earlier decided cases. Indeed, the Supreme Court on many
occasions has reconceptualized precedent, deciding that an earlier decision
rested on a different constitutional principle than the case itself had identified.
To provide just a few examples, Griswold’s famous effort to ground the
constitutional right to privacy in penumbras emanating from the Bill of Rights
was reoriented to understanding privacy as an aspect of the liberty that is
protected by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. The doctrinal
grounding for the right to travel provides yet another example. The “right to
travel throughout the length and breadth of our land” that led the Court to
strike down durational requirements for welfare in Shapiro v. Thompson was
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause. In Saenz v. Roe, however, the
Court determined that the “right of the newly arrived citizen” to receive the
same welfare benefits that long term residents receive instead rested on the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Having established that reconceptualization is a part of contemporary
constitutional practice, it remains to be shown that the particular decision of
Shelley v. Kraemer can and should be reconceptualized.
B. Shelley As a Statutory Decision. Shelley can plausibly be recast as a
decision that is grounded in the Thirteenth rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment. To see this, let us look more closely at the Thirteenth
Amendment. That Amendment’s first section states that “[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States . . .” By its terms
it is self-executing. In the Civil Rights Cases the Supreme Court provided a
narrow construction of the first section, announcing that it “simply abolished
slavery.” The first Justice Harlan famously disagreed, expressing his view in
the case of Hodges v. United States that section 1 “by its own force . . . destroyed
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Professor Fallon’s account provides a full theoretical defense of the proposition that constitutional
legitimacy is a function of public acceptance. See Fallon, supra note 175, at 1824-25. On this
sophisticated view of legitimacy, the fact that reconceptualization is a deeply entrenched and uncontested
methodology is strong evidence that it is publicly accepted and accordingly legitimate.
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See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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See id. at 638 (concluding that the waiting period “clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause”).
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526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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See id. at 506. For a more recent example of the phenomenon of reconceptualization, see Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 73 U.S.L.W. 4343, 4347 (2005) (deciding that the “substantially advances” test
formerly understood to be an aspect of takings doctrine in fact is a component of due process analysis).
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109 U.S. 3, 30 (1883).
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slavery and all its incidents and badges, and established freedom.” On this approach,
the racially restrictive covenants in Shelley could have been held to be in
violation of the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment if racially restrictive
covenants were to be deemed incidents or badges of slavery. Although this is
not an illogical approach to reconceptualizing Shelley, stare decisis and
institutional considerations make it a second-best approach.
Shelley is more plausibly grounded, however, in the legislative powers
that are created by the second section of the Thirteenth Amendment, which
provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”
The Court stated in the Civil Rights Cases that Congress’
enforcement powers under section 2 extend beyond abolition of slavery itself
to include the power to address the “incidents” of slavery. Furthermore,
when Congress acts to “eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and
involuntary servitude,” its regulations “may be direct and primary, operating
upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not.”
This is particularly significant for present purposes, for this means that
legislation enacted pursuant to section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment is not
limited to state actors, but instead can directly regulate individuals.
But what precisely is included within Congress’ section 2 powers to
address the “incidents” of slavery? The Supreme Court in The Civil Rights Cases
was quite specific. The Court explicitly stated that “disabil[ities]” with regard
to the making of contracts and the holding of property so qualify. Said the
Court,
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[t]he long existence of African slavery in this country gave us very
distinct notions of what it was, and what were its necessary incidents.
Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master,
restraint of his movements except by the master's will, disability to hold
property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness
against a white person, and such like burdens and incapacities were
186

Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis provided).
It is true that the Court on more than one occasion has implied that it might be willing to revisit the
Civil Rights Cases’s narrow construction of section 1, indicating that it would “leave the question open”
of “whether section 1 of the Amendment by its own terms did anything more than abolish slavery.” See
City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1980) (“In Jones, the Court left open the question
whether Section 1 of the Amendment by its own terms did anything more than abolish slavery. It is also
appropriate today to leave the question open . . .”) (footnote omitted); see also General Bldg. Contractors
Assoc’n v. Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct 3141 at n. 17 (1982) (same). Nonetheless, it seems likely that the stare
decisis inertia that accompanies so hoary a case will resist its being overruled. This conclusion is not
inconsistent with this Article’s effort at reconceptualizing Shelley. Overruling the Civil Rights Cases’s
interpretation of section 1 does more violence to stare decisis and rule of law values than does
reconceptualizing Shelley such that its ultimate holding (that courts cannot enforce racially restrictive
covenants) remains in tact. For a discussion of the institutional reasons against concluding that racially
restrictive covenants violate Section 1, see infra Part IV.G.
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regulate only state actors. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-24 (2000) (affirming this
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the inseparable incidents of the institution.

193

The racially restrictive covenant at issue in Shelley, of course, purported to
disable African Americans from entering into contracts to purchase property
and for that reason would qualify as being part of the class of “necessary
incidents” of slavery.
Moreover, two federal statutes that were enacted in the late nineteenth
century prohibited racial discrimination with regard to property and contract.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which today can be found at 42
U.S.C. §1982, provides that “all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power . . . shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to . . . purchase . . . real and
personal property.” What today is known as 42 U.S.C. §1981 provides that “[a]ll
person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.” As we shall see, the Court has concluded that both these statutory
provisions were enacted pursuant to Congress’ powers under Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Crucially, these statutory provisions that proclaim that “all persons”
have the “same right[s]” enjoyed by white citizens to purchase real property
and to make and enforce contracts were in effect when the Court heard the
Shelley decision (and, indeed, they still are in effect today): what today is §1982
was codified at 8 U.S.C. §42 at the time of Shelley, and §1981 was found at 8
U.S.C. §41. The statutory language of both these provisions readily could
have been applied to racially restrictive covenants. Such covenants could have
been said to deprive Blacks of the “same right . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens . . to purchase . . . real property” in violation of §42. Similarly, racially
restrictive covenants interfere with Black citizens’ abilities to “make and
enforce contracts” for the purchase of homes – abilities that are “enjoyed by
white citizens”– thereby violating §41.
Indeed, since Shelley was decided, both statutory provisions have been
construed by the Supreme Court in ways that would make them applicable to
racially restrictive covenants. In the leading case of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., the Court held that a white citizen’s refusal to sell a home in a private
subdivision to African-Americans solely because of their race violated §1982.
Insofar as racially restrictive covenants constitute multiple private citizens’
refusals to sell their homes to African-Americans, it would follow a fortiori
under Jones’ holding that restrictive covenants would run afoul of §1982. With
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Id. (emphasis provided).
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 11 (1948).
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See Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, §, 1, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis supplied). The 1866 Act was re-enacted by
§18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, §18, 16 Stat. 140, 144. At the time that
Shelley was decided, this provision was codified as §1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. It presently is
codified as 42 U.S.C. §1982. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 & n. 28 (1968).
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See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Both cases are discussed in greater detail below.
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See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 11.
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392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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respect to §1981, the Court in Runyon v. McCrary held that a private school’s
denial of admission to Black children solely on the basis of race violated
§1981's requirement that Blacks have the same right to make and enforce
contracts enjoyed by Whites. Racially restrictive covenants interfere with Black
citizens ability to make contracts in the same manner that a denial of admission
interferes with an African-American’s ability to contract.
The Shelley Court’s failure to ground its decision in these statutes was
not mere oversight. Both these statutes had been invoked in the course of the
Supreme Court litigation. Indeed, the very first question presented in the
petition for certiorari granted by the Court was whether the restrictive
covenants violated sections 41 and 42. Moreover, the Supreme Court
referenced these statutory provisions in the course of the Shelley opinion.
Furthermore, in Hurd v. Hodge, a companion case that was handed down the
same day as Shelley, the Court relied on section 42 in its conclusion that courts
in the District of Columbia could not enforce racially restrictive covenants.
In light of the known availability of sections 41 and 42 to address the
legality of racially restrictive covenants, why didn’t the Court provide an
alternative basis for its holding grounded in these federal statutes? The
question can be sharpened: why did the Court reach to resolve a difficult
constitutional question when it could have resolved the question solely by
means of statutory interpretation?
It is difficult to definitively answer these questions, for there neither are
transcripts of the oral argument in Shelley nor conference notes from the
Justices themselves.
There nevertheless are several prime candidate
explanations. Perhaps most importantly, deciding Shelley on statutory
grounds would have required that the Court reject dictum in several earlier
cases that suggested that §§41 and 42 applied to state action but not to the
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See Shelley v. Kraemer, 331 U.S. 803 (1947) (granting cert); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
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Indeed, the Court relied upon this very canon of avoiding constitutional questions in Hurd. See id. at
850 & n.6.
205
I contacted the Library of Congress, the Supreme Court Library and the National Archives. An
extremely small number of transcripts exist prior, and according to these sources Shelley is not one of
them. I have not checked the biographies of all the sitting Justices for an account of the Court’s reasoning
in Shelley, but any such writing would be imperfect evidence in any event on account of its being the
recollection of a single (or at best several) Justices. Such an inquiry nevertheless would be interesting to
undertake.
206
It is interesting to speculate as to what other factors may have led the Court to incline in a constitutional
rather than a statutory direction. The parties challenging the restrictive covenants certainly preferred a
constitutional ruling and for that reason may have emphasized that approach. The Court itself had
recently decided an important state action decision, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and may
have been inclined for that reason to further develop the state action doctrine.
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actions of private individuals. In Corrigan v. Buckley, where suit had been
brought to enjoin a threatened violation of racially restrictive covenants, the
Supreme Court stated that 8 U.S.C. §§41 and 42 did “not in any manner
prohibit or invalidate contracts entered into by private individuals in respect to
the control and disposition of their own property.” While this language is not
properly considered a holding because “no claim that the covenants could not
validly be enforced against the appellants had been raised in the lower courts,
and no such claim was properly before” the Supreme Court, a case decided
after Corrigan nonetheless referred to the above language as a holding.
Dictum from The Civil Rights Cases also suggested to some that the Court was
of the view that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 only applied to governmental
action, though a close reading suggests that this is not the best understanding
of that dictum.
Be that as it may, the point remains that there were
precedential hurdles to relying on these federal statutes that the Shelley Court
may not have wished to jump. Indeed, the Shelley opinion went out of its way
to show that its holding was consistent with past decisions, including Corrigan
in particular.
In addition to precedential hurdles, there appears to have been a
conceptual obstacle as well to Shelley’s reliance on sections 41 and 42. A fair
reading of Hurd v. Hodge, Shelley’s companion case, conclusively shows that the
Court at that time thought that Congress had enacted section 42 pursuant to
its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, not section 2 of the
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271 U.S. 323.
Id. at 331.
209
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968). For a contrary view, see id. at 452 & n. 8 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
210
See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948).
211
See, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. at 451 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
212
To begin, the language from The Civil Rights Cases concerning §42 unquestionably is dictum because the
holding in that case concerned the 1875 civil rights act, an entirely different statute. The language thought
by some to indicate the Court’s view that the 1866 Act applied only to governmental action is as follows:
after reciting the entirety of the 1866 Act, the Court wrote that “[t]his law is clearly corrective in its
character, intended to counteract and furnish redress against state laws and proceedings, and customs
having the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified.” The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 16 (1883). The Court explained this limitation on the ground that “civil rights . . . cannot be impaired
by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws [or] customs . .
.” Id. at 17. In the very next paragraph, however, the Court stated that “[o]f course, these remarks do
not apply to those cases in which congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over
the whole subject . . . In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the . . . conduct and
transactions of individuals . . .” Id. at 18. Notably, later in the Civil Rights Cases the Court observed that
Congress has the power under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to regulate individuals as well as
governments. See id. at 20.
From this, it follows that the language thought by some to express the view that all of the 1866
Act applies only to governmental action instead applies only to those aspects of the 1866 Act (which since
had been re-enacted in 1870 under the Fourteenth Amendment) that could not have been enacted under
section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Because the Civil Rights Cases itself recognizes that Congress
had power under the Thirteenth Amendment to regulate race-based disabilities to enter contracts and hold
private property, see id. at 22, the dictum that the 1866 Act applies only to governmental action is best
construed as not applying to the Act’s proscriptions regarding contracts and property.
213
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 9 (1948).
214
334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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Thirteenth Amendment. The Hurd Court interpreted the scope of section 42
by “reference . . . to the scope and purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment;
for that statute and the Amendment were closely related both in inception and
in the objectives which Congress sought to achieve;” the Court made no such
reference, however, to the Thirteenth Amendment. As a result of
conceptualizing section 42 as growing from the soil of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court read a state action requirement into the statute: “The
action toward which the provisions of the statute under consideration is
directed is governmental action . . . . [T]he statute does not invalidate private
restrictive agreements . . .”
As high as these precedential and conceptual hurdles may have been,
however, they certainly were not insurmountable. Indeed, the Court rejected
the dicta and analysis discussed immediately above and held that these statutory
provisions applied to private parties as well as public authorities in the Jones and
Runyon cases. The Jones Court concluded that (what by then was) 42 U.S.C.
§1982 had been enacted by Congress under section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and then determined on the basis of section 1982's statutory
language and legislative history that Congress had intended the provision to
regulate private individuals as well as governmental entities. As well, the Jones
Court noted that opponents of the 1866 objected that the Act would directly
regulate private citizens and that defenders of the Act “did not deny the
accuracy of those characterizations.” Relying on the Court’s reasoning in
Jones, the Runyon Court held that §1981 likewise applied to private as well as
governmental conduct. The statutory language and legislative histories of
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See id. at 32.
See id. at 31.
217
See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413(concluding that section 1982 “is a valid exercise of the power of Congress
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment”); see also id. at 433-34 (quoting Representative Thayer as
explaining his support for the 1866 Civil Rights Act as follows: “When I voted for the amendment to
abolish slavery . . . I did not suppose that I was offering . . . a mere paper guarantee. And when I voted
for the second section of the amendment, I felt . . . certain that I had . . . given to Congress ability to
protect . . . the rights which the first section gave . . .”). Indeed, there is no plausible basis for concluding
that Congress relied on any of its powers apart from section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment when it
enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act; Congress clearly could not have relied on authority granted in section
of the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as that Amendment had not yet been adopted in 1866. As
described above, however, Congress re-adopted the 1866 Civil Rights Act in 1870, after passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to confirm the Act’s applicability against States, because some questioned
whether Congress had the power to regulate the states under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
See supra note 195. The Court’s analysis of section 42 in Hurd would be correct only on the unlikely
assumption that the Congress that re-adopted the 1866 Act to eliminate doubts concerning the act’s
constitutionality intended to limit the Act’s scope by eschewing its powers under section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment.
218
See id. at 420-26.
219
See, e.g., id. at 427(showing that Congress “had before it an imposing body of evidence pointing to the
mistreatment of Negroes by private individuals and unofficial groups, mistreatment unrelated to any
hostile state legislation” at the time it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866); see also id. at 427-435.
220
Id. at 433.
221
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (the view that §1981 addresses only governmental
actors “is wholly inconsistent with Jones’ interpretation of the legislative history of section 1 of the Civil
Rights At of 1866 . . .”). In fact, the statutory question raised in Runyon may have been importantly
different from the question in Jones because there was nontrivial evidence that §1981, unlike §1982, was
216
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these statutes were equally available to the Court in 1948 when Shelley was
decided. It follows that the Court could have decided Shelley on statutory
grounds. For this reason, it is perfectly plausible to reconceptualize Shelley as
having been decided on statutory grounds.
222

C.
Shelley as Quasi-Federal Common Law. To the suggestion made
above that Shelley can be grounded in federal statutory law, the objection might
be posed that this means that racially restrictive covenants would have been
legal and enforceable in the event Congress had not enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. To this objection there are two responses. First, the mere fact
that legislative inaction leads to an undesirable state of affairs does not mean
that the Constitution necessarily provides the problem’s solution; the solution
instead may lie exclusively with the legislature. Second, be that as it may, in this
particular context the Court could have generated a non-constitutional solution
enacted under Congress’ §5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than Congress’ §2 powers
under the Thirteenth Amendment. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 195-198 (White, J., dissenting). This precise
scope of section 1982 does not matter for present purposes, of course, because the racially restrictive
covenant in Shelley would have been invalid under federal law even if only 42 U.S.C. section 1982 applied
to it.
222
It may seem remarkable that neither the Court nor scholarly commentators have advanced the argument
made here that Shelley can be reconceptualized on statutory grounds, but that indeed appears to be the
case. Though a cursory reading of Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 331
(1964) (Black, J., dissenting), might appear to argue that Shelley could have been decided under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, a fair reading of Justice Black’s discussion in Bell reveals that he was not arguing that
the racially restrictive covenants themselves violated federal statutory rights granted by the Civil Rights
Act, but that the Act prohibited judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants and somehow
transformed enforcement into state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here are Justice
Black’s words:
It seems pretty clear that the reason judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenants
in Shelley was deemed state action was not merely the fact that a state court had
acted, but rather that it had acted 'to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or
color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and
financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell.' 334 U.S., at 19,
68 S.Ct. at 845. In other words, this Court held that state enforcement of the
covenants had the effect of denying to the parties their federally guaranteed right to
own, occupy, enjoy, and use their property without regard to race or color. Thus, the
line of cases from Buchanan through Shelley establishes these propositions: (1)
When an owner of property is willing to sell and a would-be purchaser is willing to
buy, then the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which gives all persons the same right to
'inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey' property, prohibits a State, whether
through its legislature, executive, or judiciary, from preventing the sale on the
grounds of the race or color of one of the parties. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, 334
U.S., at 19, 68 S.Ct. at 845.
Bell, 378 U.S. at 331 (Black, J., dissenting). In other words, Justice Black still conceptualized Shelley as
having been decided on the basis that judicial enforcement violated federal law, not that the covenant itself
violated federal law.
Nor has the Court sought to reconceptualize Shelley on statutory grounds in other cases. The
most obvious place one would expect to find a reconceptualization of Shelley on statutory grounds would
be the Jones decision. One noted constitutional law casebook cites to Jones to support the claim that “[i]t
has been urged that Shelley can be explained on the basis of 42 U.S.C. §1982.” SULLIVAN AND GUNTHER ,
supra note 49, at 882. A careful reading of the opinion, however, reveals no such thing. The Shelley
decision is referenced only twice in the opinion, see Jones, 392 U.S. at 419 & n.24; id. at 445, and neither
time does the Court suggest that Shelley could have been decided on the basis of federal statutory law.
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to the problem of racially restrictive covenants even had Congress not acted.
Grounded once again in the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court could have
relied on a form of quasi-federal common law that I shall call “constitutional
preemption” to hold that the Constitution itself preempts either state
regulation or private action of the sort involved with racially restrictive
covenants.
As I will soon explain, constitutional preemption is
distinguishable from classic federal common law insofar as the federal court
does not create a governing federal rule in place of the state rule that is
preempted. Importantly, this deflects the challenges that some scholars and
judges have identified in respect of federal courts’ powers to create federal
common law.
1. Distinguishing Federal Common Law From the QuasiFederal Common Law of Constitutional Preemption. Showing the precedential
basis for understanding Shelley as an instance of quasi-federal common law first
requires a clear understanding of the difference between classic federal
common law and constitutional preemption. To begin, although Erie v.
Tompkins declared that “[t]here is no federal general common law,” federal
courts still create what has been called “specialized” federal common law under
certain conditions. Post-Erie federal common law is binding on both federal
and state courts, but it does not have the status of constitutional law and
hence may be overturned by Congress.
The legitimacy and appropriate scope of post-Erie federal common law
has been widely discussed in the scholarly literature. Scholars have identified
two considerations that cast doubt on the legitimacy of federal common law,
both which can be traced to Erie itself. The first is the federalism-based
concern grounded in the Tenth Amendment of displacing regulatory authority
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Although Professor Alfred Hill famously created the phrase “constitutional preemption,” see Alfred
Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967),
I am using the term differently than he does. For Hill, federal judicial power to fashion federal rules
appears to be coterminous with the areas that have been preempted by the Constitution. See id. at 1025
(“There are areas of federal preemption, created by force of the Constitution, in which the federal courts
formulate rules of decision without guidance from statutory or constitutional standards . . .” ); see Paul
J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie – The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV . 1682, 1683 & n. 9
(1974)(criticizing this aspect of Hill’s argument).
224
The distinction I make here is inspired by Brad Clark’s excellent article. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996).
225
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
226
The term “specialized federal common law” comes from Henry Friendly, see Henry J. Friendly, In Praise
of Erie – And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 407 (1964).
227
See id. at 405.
228
Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1975). This is
particularly important for present purposes, because it means that contemporary federal common law does
not displace congressional participation, but instead holds the potential of opening a “dialogue” with
Congress. Id. at 29. This is especially significant in contexts where the normatively attractive outcomes
are highly context-dependent, for Congress has several well-known institutional advantages vis-a-vis courts
in generating complex codes that account for multiple variables, as will be discussed at greater length
below in Part IV.G.
229
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An
“Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L REV. 761, 765 (1989); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); Clark, supra note 224, at 1255-70.
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that properly belongs to the States. The second relates to the source of
judicial power to create federal common law rules. These two considerations
are analytically distinct; even if states are without power to regulate a particular
matter that falls within Congress’ regulatory authority, it does not follow that
federal courts have the power to fill in the regulatory vacuum. This latter
question concerning if and when federal courts have power to fashion federal
common law rules is an instantiation of the separation-of-powers principle that
federal law-making is assigned to Congress, not the federal courts.
Keeping in mind these two distinct concerns, there is an important
difference between federal common law and the quasi-federal common law
that I have dubbed “constitutional preemption.” Constitutional preemption
is a federal court’s determination that states are without regulatory authority in
a particular field. Accordingly, while constitutional preemption may implicate
the first obstacle to federal common law under Erie, it does not implicate the
second. To illustrate, in adopting a rule of federal common law in the case of
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, the Court both displaced state law that
otherwise would have governed rights under commercial paper and then
“fashioned the governing rule of law according to [its] own standards.”
Contrast this with what happens when the Court undertakes constitutional
preemption, as in the dormant commerce clause cases. When the Court struck
down on dormant commerce clause grounds a Connecticut law requiring outof-state shippers of beer to affirm that their posted prices for products sold in
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See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80 (holding that federal court creation of general federal common law has
“invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states,” language that
mirrors the Tenth Amendment).
231
See id. at 78 (“[N]o clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts”
to “declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature of
‘general’ . . .).
232
See Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie – The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683 & n. 9
(1974)(making this point). For a partial defense of the contrary view, see Field, supra note 229, at 983
(arguing that federal courts can make federal common law “whenever federal interests require a federal
solution.”).
233
Both of these concerns are statutorily addressed by the Rules of Decision Act, which provides that
“[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply.” 28 U.S.C. §1652. After Erie was decided, the Court
typically relied on this statute, rather than constitutional analysis. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth
of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 704 (1974) (noting that on account of the Rules of Decision Act “[i]t
therefore is not the least bit surprising that the Court did not mention the constitutional basis of the Erie
decision again for eighteen years”).
234
Cf. Clark, supra note 224, at 1374-75 (justifying the case of Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., in
similar terms).
235
318 U.S. 363 (1943).
236
Id. at 366 (holding that “[t]he rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues
are governed by federal rather than local law”).
237
Id. at 367. At issue in that case was whether the United States could recover for a check it had issued,
but which had been fraudulently cashed, where 2½ months had passed between the forgery and
notification of Clearfield Trust. Pennsylvania law provided that “unreasonable delay” in providing notice
of forgery barred recovery, and Clearfield Trust defended on this ground. The United States Supreme
Court displaced Pennsylvania law, creating in its place a rule under which the federal government’s failure
to give prompt notice of forgery operated as a defense only if the delay resulted in damage. Id. At 367-69.
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Connecticut were no higher than the prices at which the products were sold in
bordering States, the Court ruled that Connecticut “exceed[ed] the inherent
limits of [its] authority” but did not craft an alternative rule in its place. This
always is true of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence: it displaces state law
but does not replace it with a federal substantive rule. And this is true of
constitutional preemption, as well.
Understanding constitutional preemption’s relation to federal common
law implies two things. First, constitutional preemption is less difficult to
doctrinally justify than federal common law because the federal court is not
fashioning a governing federal rule, but is only ruling that states are without the
power to regulate. Second, constitutional preemption is one component of
many federal common law decisions. Those federal common law decisions
hence are instructive vis-a-vis the conditions that must pertain for
constitutional preemption to be found.
2.
Shelley as Constitutional Preemption. This subsection
shows that the Shelley case readily can be conceptualized as an instance of
constitutional preemption. The dormant commerce clause and federal
common law case law provide precedent for understanding Shelley in this
fashion. Indeed, careful analysis shows that treating Shelley as a quasi-federal
common law decision is even less problematic vis-a-vis Erie concerns than is
either dormant commerce clause doctrine or federal common law. If dormant
commerce clause and federal common law are doctrinally legitimate, it follows
a fortiori that a constitutional preemption approach to Shelley is legitimate.
Shelley readily can be characterized as an instance of constitutional
preemption. To begin, the Court did not prescribe a substantive rule that
governed the parties. Erie’s second obstacle pertaining to federal court power
to fashion substantive rules accordingly does not arise. Shelley can be
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See Healy v. the Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989).
Id. at 336.
240
One of the country’s foremost constitutional law scholars, Professor Henry Monaghan, has argued that
dormant commerce clause is a type of federal common law. See Monaghan, supra note 228, at 15-17.
There is much that recommends his view insofar as the dormant commerce clause involves federal court
creation of complex rules without statutory directive (and in this way is of a “common law” character),
which are “wholly subject to congressional revision” (as is the case with post-Erie federal common law).
Id. at 17. Monaghan hypothesizes that dormant commerce clause doctrine has not been conceptualized
as a form of federal common law because the result is “Marbury-like invalidation and does not ‘look like’
the affirmative creation of federal regulatory rules.” Id. Monaghan dismisses the significance of this
distinction, see id. at 17-18, but the analysis provided above in text shows that this is of great import in
respect of the legitimacy of federal common law. It is true, as Professor Monaghan notes, that dormant
commerce clause displacement of state law frequently leaves some operative law in place, see id. at 17, but
Erie’s second concern with regard to the source of federal court-lawmaking power is not triggered so long
as the operative law that remains has not been created by federal courts. See also infra note 241.
241
Among other things, this explains why the Supreme Court has not had to explain why its dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence is consistent with the Rules of Decision Act; the terms of the Act do not
appear to be even potentially applicable insofar as a federal court that strikes down a state statute on the
basis of the dormant commerce clause does not fashion a federal rule to take the stricken state law’s place.
See supra note 233 (explaining the Rules of Decision Act).
242
Many but not all: constitutional preemption is not part of those decisions where federal courts fashion
federal common law for the purpose of giving effect to a federal statute. See, e.g, Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
239
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understood as a limitation on what is permissible for individuals to do under
state contract and property law. Akin to what Congress enacted in the form
of sections 1981 and 1982, Shelley can be understood as a judicial determination
that race-based obstacles to contracting or property ownership are
impermissible.
So understood, Shelley poses less of a threat to Erie’s first obstacle of
disrupting state autonomy than does the dormant commerce clause doctrine.
This is so because Shelley did not displace any state law. More than 20 years
before Shelley the Court had ruled that racial zoning – state or municipal
legislation to bar African Americans from living in particular areas – was
beyond state legislative authority on account of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Shelley decision accordingly did not displace any state regulatory authority
whatsoever. Instead, on the constitutional preemption view advanced here,
Shelley simply determined that what had been thought to be a realm of
individual decisionmaking autonomy was not. In fact, because Shelley displaced
no state legislative authority, but only private citizens’ decision making
authority, Shelley does not even implicate Erie’s first concern.
But what legitimate basis was there for the Court to displace individual
decision making autonomy? This question is particularly pressing in relation
to constitutional preemption, for the Constitution virtually always limits
governments, not individuals. The answer is that the source of constitutional
preemption in Shelley is the Thirteenth Amendment, one of the few
constitutional provisions that directly limits private citizens as well as
governments. Dormant commerce clause doctrine is particularly helpful at
this point in our analysis. Assuming for present purposes that Section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment proscribes slavery but not its badges and incidents,
it is incontestable that Congress has the power under Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment to proscribe race-based obstacles to contract and
property, and to apply such proscriptions directly to private individuals.
Shelley thus can be seen as a Thirteenth Amendment analogue to dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence: even though Congress had not acted pursuant
to its Section 2 powers, Shelley applied proscriptions that Congress could have
legislated to entities that Congress had the power to reach. And, like dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence, the proscription was not a federal rule that
directly regulated behavior, but instead was a determination that a given subject
was beyond the regulatory competence of non-federal actors (in this case,
individuals).
The final question is whether the circumstances in Shelley were
appropriate for constitutional preemption. Guidance can be provided by
considering other instances where federal courts have found constitutional
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As the Shelley opinion itself noted, racial zoning by municipalities had been struck down as early as
1917. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 11 (discussing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) and Harmon v.
Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927)).
244
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 30 (1883).
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See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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See Civil Right Cases, 109 U.S. at 30, discussed supra at p. 3.
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preemption (though even the complete absence of analogous precedent would
not be fatal since all doctrines must start somewhere). Relevant precedent
includes not just dormant commerce clause, but also federal common law case
law. Although the contexts where preemption has been found are not similar
to racially restrictive covenants, a general principle identified by the Court as
explaining where preemption is found – where there are “uniquely federal
interests” – quite plausibly encompasses racially restrictive covenants.
To see this, let us look first to federal common law. The modern case
law has taken pains to explain the basis on which state law is displaced. For
instance, in a decision one year before Shelley, the case of United States v.
Standard Oil Co. of California, the Court reasoned that Erie limitations on federal
court powers do not extend to what are “essentially federal matters.” Said the
Court,
247

248

[T]he Erie decision had no effect, and was intended to have none, to
bring within the governance of state law matters exclusively federal,
because made so by constitutional or valid congressional command,
or others so vitally affecting interests, powers and relations of the
Federal Government as to require uniform national disposition
rather than diversified state rulings.
249

In that case, the Court held state negligence law did not apply to a lawsuit by
the United State for alleged negligence by a defendant whose truck had injured
a soldier. The case implicated “essentially federal matters,” and state law
accordingly was displaced, because the litigation concerned the military and
affected the power of the purse. The more recent judicial formulations in the
federal common law context are much the same. Matters involving “uniquely
federal interests” it is said “are so committed by the Constitution and laws of
the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and
replaced.”
In the modern dormant commerce clause cases, by contrast, the Court
has not sought to explain the source of federal judicial power to displace state
law. This undoubtedly is due to the fact that dormant commerce clause case
law is longstanding and extensive; the Court is content to refine the doctrinal
rules that have been developed in piecemeal case law fashion and to disregard
foundational questions as to the constitutional authority to displace state law.
The early cases in which the Court fashioned dormant commerce clause
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See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504 (quoting Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640
(1981)).
248
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). See also id. (“There was no
purpose or effect [in Erie] for broadening state power over matters essentially of federal character or for
determining whether issues are of that nature.”)
249
Id.
250
Id. at 307.
251
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
252
This is not true of Justices Thomas and Scalia, who reject the legitimacy of the dormant commerce
clause doctrine. See Camps Newfound/ Owatanna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609-17
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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doctrine, however, did consider the source of judicial power to supplant state
law, and they rationalized displacement of state law much as the Court has
done one hundred years later in its federal common law jurisprudence. Thus,
in the seminal case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, the
Court ruled that although states were not generally deprived of legislative
authority over those areas (such as commerce) that Congress had
constitutional authority to regulate, there were certain subject matters with
respect to which state regulatory power was excluded even absent
congressional regulation. The Court referred to these as subjects that are “in
their nature national . . .” Matters that “may justly be said to be of such a
nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress” accordingly “require[]
that a similar authority should not exist in the states.”
In short, in both the federal common law and dormant commerce
clause contexts, the Court has explained displacement of state law in similar
ways: by determining that the subject matter is in its “nature national” and
“essentially national.” It must be acknowledged that the contexts in which the
Court has found such overwhelming national interests sufficient to uproot state
law are not similar to racially restrictive covenants: unique federal interests in
the federal common law have been held to include “obligations to and rights
of the United States under its contracts,” the “priority of liens stemming from
federal lending programs,” “civil liability of federal officials for actions taken
in the course of their duty,” and certain questions touching on foreign
relations, and Cooley, the important early dormant commerce clause case,
spoke of subjects that “admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation.”
Nonetheless, a strong argument can be mounted that matters pertaining
to slavery similarly amount to a “uniquely federal interest” that justifies the
displacement of state regulatory authority. The proposition that the absolute
rejection of slavery, as well as its incidents and badges, is a uniquely federal
interest likely is self-evident to many. Doctrinal support for this proposition
is that the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against slavery extends not
only to states, but also applies directly to individuals. As well, Congress has
powers under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to regulate not only
states, but also individuals. The Thirteenth Amendment is one of the only
constitutional limitation that applies directly to private citizens, and this
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constitutional exception plausibly can be understood to mean that slavery is of
such significance that it cannot be permitted to exist even outside the formal
state-defined legal framework. That is to say, not only must state law be
displaced by the anti-slavery imperative, but so must private ordering. The
Thirteenth Amendment’s limitation of both states and private individuals thus
reflects an unusual choice of opting for nationwide uniformity: uniformity
across not only polities but across informal private practices. The wide-ranging
uniformity created by the Thirteenth Amendment thus amounts to an explicit
textual basis for concluding that matters relating to slavery constitute a uniquely
federal interest.
264

IV. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS: THE CASE FOR RECONCEPTUALIZING SHELLEY
AS A THIRTEENTH AMEND MENT DECISION
Having shown in the previous Part that there were plausible grounds
aside from the Fourteenth Amendment on which the Shelley decision could
have rested, this Part IV identifies and explains seven advantages to
reconceptualizing Shelley as a Thirteenth Amendment-based decision. These
seven benefits comprise the normative case for reconceptualizing Shelley. In
addition, these seven benefits constitute seven additional drawbacks to the
scholarly approaches examined above in Part II.B that seek to explain Shelley
as a Fourteenth Amendment-based decision.
A. A More Compelling Conceptualization. Reconceptualization in the
manner advocated here is sensible because the Thirteenth Amendment
framework provides a more compelling conceptual account of what made
racially restrictive covenants wrongful. At bottom, it was not judicial
enforcement that was troublesome, but the substance of the covenants
themselves. The legal disabilities imposed by blocs of restrictive covenants –
interference with African-Americans’ abilities to enter into contracts and hold
real property by virtue of their racial identity – reproduced several of the core
legal disabilities that characterized slavery. Because the Thirteenth Amendment
(unlike the Fourteenth Amendment) applies to individuals, it (but not the
Fourteenth Amendment) targets the genuine problem with racially restrictive
covenants – not judicial enforcement but the covenants themselves, which are
best understood as the product of individuals’ activities rather than action of
the state and hence fall outside the Fourteenth Amendment’s purview.
B. Relieving Stress on the Public/Private Distinction. Reorienting Shelley in
the manner advocated here eliminates the jurisprudential perplexity regarding
the public/private distinction that Shelley created. It is important to be clear
about what I am claiming here. The public/private distinction is subtle and
controversial even without Shelley, and this Article does not purport to provide
a full-fledged defense of the distinction.
What I do claim is that the
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considerable threat to the public/private distinction posed by Shelley’s
attribution rationale disappears entirely under the Thirteenth Amendment
reconceptualization advocated here. The necessity of identifying state action
arose in Shelley only because the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment,
which long has been understood as limiting governmental, but not private,
activity. There would have been no need for the Court to identify state action
under a Thirteenth Amendment approach because that constitutional provision
has been held to apply directly to individuals. In short, there is no reason to
identify an activity as “public” or “private” under a Thirteenth Amendment
approach because the Thirteenth Amendment applies to both.
C.
Facilitating the Creation of a More Principled State Action Doctrine.
Closely related to the point immediately above, reconceptualizing Shelley may
facilitate the creation of a more principled state action doctrine. Because Shelley
is so well known, and is universally regarded as a state action case, the case
undoubtedly has exerted an important influence on how the legal community
thinks about state action. Indeed, Shelley is one case that virtually every law
student studies and, more so than virtually any other, a case that almost all
attorneys seem to remember. Shelley accordingly is a case that helps to
constitute people’s “loadstar” intuitions about state action, and efforts to
devise principles that explain state action accordingly must accommodate
Shelley’s fact pattern. That poses a considerable challenge to the formulation
of a conceptually sound state action doctrine for the reasons long identified by
courts and commentators: if judicial enforcement attributes a contract’s
substantive provisions to the government, then individuals must “conform
their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as almost always,
the individuals might later seek the security of potential judicial enforcement.”
Reconceptualizing Shelley as a Thirteenth Amendment-based decision takes the
case outside of the state action context, thereby liberating the state action
doctrine from the hopeless task of identifying state action on Shelley’s facts.
This might aid the creation of a more conceptually sound state action doctrine.
D. Making Racially Restrictive Covenants Illegal. Fourth, the Thirteenth
Amendment’s direct application to individuals solves a deeply disturbing
byproduct of Shelley’s Fourteenth Amendment approach. Under Shelley, the
restrictive covenants themselves were perfectly legal. A pre-Shelley decision had
held that racially restrictive covenants did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment since the covenants themselves involved no state action, and
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Shelley expressly confirmed this holding.
The fact that racially restrictive covenants remained legal indicts the
logic and appeal of Shelley’s approach for at least three reasons. First, it is an
outrageous embarrassment for racially restrictive covenants to be permissible
in our country. Second, it is very odd for a contract to be legal but its
enforcement to be unconstitutional. This runs against the strong norm in our
country’s legal culture that legal rights are accompanied by legal remedies when
those rights are violated. Deviations from that norm typically are subject to
harsh rebuke by legal scholars. Consider the criticism that attends
contemporary Eleventh Amendment doctrine, under which Congress may
grant individuals rights against states but the individuals may not sue in either
federal or state court if states violate these rights. Much of the scholarly
critique of the Eleventh Amendment equally applies to what Shelley created:
contractual legal rights that are legal but not judicially enforceable.
Third, a recent study by Richard Brooks, a professor at Yale Law
School, concludes that Northern residential segregation . . . was maintained and
perpetuated in large part through racial restrictive covenants” notwithstanding
the fact that such covenants were judicially unenforceable. Brooks argues that
“[c]ovenants were valuable signals that served to coordinate the behavior of a
variety of private individual and institutional actors – signals that remained
effective despite their later legal unenforceability.” The legality of restrictive
convenants was the result of Shelley’s Fourteenth Amendment approach, which
required the location of state action and therefore could not intervene before
the point of judicial enforcement. This Article’s Thirteenth Amendment
approach, by contrast, operates directly against the restrictive covenants
themselves; because the Thirteenth Amendment applies to individuals,
“private” action that constitutes a badge or incident of slavery – such as
depriving African-Americans of the ability to contract or hold property through
the use of racially restrictive covenants – runs afoul of Thirteenth Amendment
principles. Indeed, under the Thirteenth Amendment based statutes discussed
earlier in this Article, racially restrictive covenants themselves are illegal as a
matter of federal law.
E.
Consistency with Post-Shelley Case Law. A fifth reason for
reconceptualizing Shelley is that a Thirteenth Amendment approach better
explains the post-Shelley case law. As shown in Part I, courts almost uniformly
have rejected Shelley’s attribution rationale; courts have not deemed judicial
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enforcement of individuals’ agreements to qualify as state action that triggers
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations to the substance of
the agreements. What are we to make of the disjunction between Shelley’s
Fourteenth Amendment attribution rationale and the decided case law? Two
possibilities suggest themselves: either (1) Shelley’s principle can be used to
critique the post-Shelley case law, or (2) the post-Shelley case law can be used to
indict Shelley. The considerations that favor the case law method favor the
latter approach. Underwriting the case law methodology is a preference for
inductive reasoning from the concrete over deductive reasoning from first
principles. The choice between the two ultimately is driven by epistemology:
is knowledge of this sort more likely to be identified in the abstract, or through
examination of a series of context-specific outcomes? Case law reasoning is
a form of inductive reasoning that is based on the expectation that principles
will emerge over time from a careful examination of the pattern that is
produced by case-by-case decisionmaking.
To the extent that the case law method’s inductive approach is superior
to deductive reasoning in this context, the pattern of post-Shelley case law
simultaneously indicts Shelley’s Fourteenth Amendment approach and
recommends this Article’s Thirteenth Amendment approach. To begin, the
virtually uniform rejection of Shelley’s Fourteenth Amendment approach
documented in Part I is evidence that the Shelley Court’s rationale does not
accurately capture the principle that appropriately grounds the decision’s
holding. Recall that Shelley’s Fourteenth Amendment approach necessitated
the location of state action, and state action in the enforcement of a private
covenant was identified by virtue of Shelley’ “attribution” rationale. So, for
example, if the attribution rationale had been followed, then judicial
enforcement of contracts limiting speech would have triggered constitutional
review, as would judicial enforcement of arbitral awards of punitive damages
that were assessed absent the procedures that courts constitutionally must
utilize before assessing punitive damages. Similarly, under the attribution
approach, courts should have refused to enforce testamentary wills that
condition inheritance on a child’s marriage to a person of a specified religious
faith. But, as documented above, these outcomes have not materialized.
Rather, the consistent pattern across case law over a period of more
than fifty years across a wide array of courts and Supreme Court Justices is far
better explained by the Article’s Thirteenth Amendment approach. Under this
alternative rationale for Shelley, the refusal to judicially enforce racially
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restrictive covenants is not predicated on judicial enforcement constituting
state action. Rather, what happens to the covenants is a consequence of the
racial content of the covenants themselves and the fact that the covenants
sought to reproduce some of the legal disabilities that characterized slavery.
On this approach, the logic that renders racially restrictive covenants illegal has
no bearing on covenants limiting speech or testamentary provision that aim to
influence a beneficiary’s religious choices. Accordingly, the post-Shelley case
law is fully consistent with a Thirteenth Amendment conceptualization of
Shelley.
Additional evidence that a Thirteenth Amendment approach is
consistent with post-Shelley cases law are the many judicial opinions that have
suggested that Shelley is limited to instances of “race discrimination.” Though
these cases did not explain why the attribution rationale properly applied only
to race, a Thirteenth Amendment approach answers why Shelley’s interference
with private ordering appropriately is properly limited to the racial context: the
Thirteenth Amendment’s proscription against slavery quite understandably is
race-focused.
A Thirteenth Amendment approach also provides a principled basis for
critiquing some of the post-Shelley case law. As shown above, the Supreme
Court was unwilling to extend Shelley in the sit-in cases. The Court did not
explicitly explain its unwillingness to rely on Shelley, but this presumably was
because the Court could not identify a principled stopping-point to the
attribution rationale; under Shelley’s approach, after all, an individual’s
discriminatory animus behind requesting that the police enforce a trespass
ordinance and remove an unwanted (Black) visitor would be attributed to state,
triggering Fourteenth Amendment limitations. A store’s refusal to do business
with a person solely on the basis of that person’s race, however, is plausibly
characterized as a race-based refusal to contract that accordingly could
constitute an incident of slavery. The sit-in cases thus could have been
decided on the ground that the storekeepers’ refusal to serve AfricanAmericans ran afoul of Thirteenth Amendment principles, without threatening
to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to a bigoted homeowner who asked the
police to remove an unwanted house guest.
F.
Reviving a Largely Neglected Constitutional Amendment. Sixth,
284

285

286

287

288

289

284

Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1995); see supra Part I.B.1.
See supra Part I.B.
286
This is not to suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment’s purview does not extend beyond AfricanAmericans. Cf. St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (holding that anti-discrimination
provision in statute enacted pursuant to section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment applies to person of
Arabian ancestry). But one is hard pressed to argue that contracts that interfere with an individual’s ability
to speak publicly as she wishes or testamentary provisions that seek to influence a beneficiary’s religious
choices fall within a broadly construed notion enslavement based on a person’s ancestry, as the case law
requires.
287
See supra p. 13 and following.
288
See supra at p. 35 (discussing what constitutes an “incident” of slavery).
289
This is a hypothetical that long has concerned commentators. See Gregory P. Magarian, The First
Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Debate, 73 GEORGE WASH.
L. REV. 101, 148 & n. 309 (2004) (collecting sources).
285

[2006]

Reconceptualizing Shelley

52

reconceptualizing Shelley in Thirteenth Amendment terms may help to give life
to a constitutional principle – the Thirteenth Amendment’s anti-slavery
principle – that has largely been overlooked by both courts and scholars.
Reconceptualizing Shelley in this fashion would serve as a correction to Shelley
insofar as that decision helped solidify a political culture that largely ignores the
Thirteenth Amendment.
A bit of background is important to fully understand these points. The
written Constitution contains a large number of provisions, yet at any point in
time only a handful of its constitutional principles have salience in the public
mind. Moreover, which of the Constitution’s many principles have high
salience varies over time. For example, although the Contract Clause was the
single most heavily litigated constitutional provision in the nineteenth century,
few of today’s citizens, lawyers, or government officials are familiar with it.
Conversely, what is among today’s most salient constitutional principles – free
speech – received little public or judicial attention as recently as the early
twentieth century. And some constitutional principles have never enjoyed
significant salience; consider, for example, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
privileges or immunities clause.
Although the consequences of what subset of the Constitution’s
principles has high salience can readily escape notice, they are significant. The
constitutional principles that are dominant likely help to set the public’s
conception of justice and, ultimately, legislative agendas. Additionally,
dominant constitutional principles shape the legislative and executive branches’
understanding of the limits of their powers in ways that overlooked principles
do not. For example, it is virtually inconceivable that a state legislature today
would enact a statute barring media accounts of an execution “beyond the
statement of the fact that such convict was on the day in question duly
executed according to law.” Yet Minnesota enacted such a law in the early
twentieth century, which was upheld by that state’s supreme court in 1907.
Conversely, whereas the Contract Clause currently plays little role in public
discourse or legislative debate, nineteenth century debates in state legislatures
were filled with arguments explaining why proposed legislation was consistent
with the Contract Clause.
Returning to the subject at hand, the Thirteenth Amendment does not
play a particularly large role in the public mind. Aided by cases such as Shelley,
today’s constitutional culture pays little heed to concepts such as slavery and
its incidents and badges, but instead conceptualizes justice primarily in
Fourteenth Amendment terms of equality and due process. The consequences
of refocusing public and governmental attention on the Thirteenth
Amendment are a matter of speculation, but they might be significant.
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“Equality” and “due process” are concepts that skew thoughts about
constitutional justice away from particular groups’ (i.e., African Americans’)
experiences. So, for example, grounding the civil rights revolution for African
Americans in the rubric of equal protection may have rendered affirmative
action vulnerable in ways that a Thirteenth Amendment grounding would not
have insofar as there is a plausible argument that affirmative action is in tension
with equal protection commitments. Similarly, it is possible that a
constitutional culture more attuned to slavery would have been more receptive
to arguments for reparations. Perhaps a culture in which the Constitution’s
anti-slavery principle had been more salient would be more outraged by the
human trafficking that still occurs and more receptive to arguments that certain
working conditions qualify as modern-day slavery.
While it admittedly is difficult to know how our country would have
been different had the Constitution’s anti-slavery principle been more salient,
there are good reasons to believe that the principle’s marginalization indeed has
had concrete effects. Reconceptualizing Shelley in the manner advanced here
may help to revitalize the largely neglected constitutional principles that inhere
in the Thirteenth Amendment.
G. Institutional Implications. A seventh advantage of reconceptualizing
Shelley in Thirteenth Amendment terms is institutional in nature: under both the
Thirteenth Amendment grounded statutory and constitutional preemption
approaches advocated here, solving the problem of racially restrictive
covenants falls not only to the Supreme Court, but also to Congress and the
President. Under Shelley’s Fourteenth Amendment approach, by contrast,
solving the problem of restrictive covenants falls to the courts, and especially
the Supreme Court; Shelley concluded that judicial enforcement would have
been unconstitutional, and constitutionality determinations fall almost
exclusively to courts under contemporary American practice.
The institutional implications of grounding Shelley in the Thirteenth
Amendment are important because there are good reasons to conclude that the
legislative and executive branches’ institutional competencies would be useful
to the task of determining what private agreements should be illegal. To stave
off potential confusion, I do not mean to suggest that courts properly have no
role, but only that the other governmental branches also have important
functions. In other words, cross-branch collaboration would be beneficial to
determining the legality of various private agreements.
Formally establishing the role properly played by the more political
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branches in solving the problem of racially restrictive covenants requires a
three-step analysis. First is an assessment of the type of considerations that
appropriately inform enforceability determinations. The second step is a
consideration of the peculiar institutional competencies of the legislative and
executive branches, with an eye to determining whether their special
characteristics are particularly suited to tasks identified in the first step. The
third and final step is an inquiry as to whether the legislature and/or executive
have other characteristics that would imperil the process of solving the
restrictive covenant problem.
Analysis at the first step – identifying the considerations that are
relevant to determining whether private contracts should be judicially
enforceable – is immensely aided by turning to the post-Shelley scholarly articles
surveyed above in Part II. Among the enduring contributions of these many
fine pieces of scholarship is their identification of considerations that are
relevant to determining the status of contracts whose substantive content
implicates constitutional principles. Even though these articles housed their
normative analyses under the Fourteenth Amendment (mistakenly, in my view),
many of their insights are applicable to a Thirteenth Amendment analysis. To
be clear, for present purposes I do not intend to defend any particular
normative approach to analyzing the judicial enforceability of private contracts,
but only to show the range of proposals that have been advanced by scholars
(step 1) so as to establish the likelihood (in step 2) that the more political
branches have important institutional roles to play under all these proposed
approaches.
Let us start with Step 1. Recall Professor Henkin’s argument that
determining whether there was state action demands an assessment of the
quantum of the competing constitutional values of liberty, property and equal
protection that were implicated. Professors Glennon and Nowak similarly
argued that there is a “battle for supremacy between the asserted rights of
private persons” and that the relevant question is whether the state’s permitting
a person to engage in a particular activity undermines another person’s rights
to such a degree that the Constitution is appropriately triggered. Professor
Strauss argued that it was appropriate to refuse enforcement of “private”
contracts in the Shelley era because discrimination at that time was a product of
the interaction of government and private individuals. Professor Carol Rose
similarly has suggested that applying constitutional limitations to the
enforcement of restrictive covenants can be justified on the ground that the
value of restrictive covenants turned on “the culture and customs of prejudice”
that were “so widespread as to have the practical force of law.”
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Proceeding to step 2, under all the scholars’ approaches discussed just
above, the legislative and executive branches’ particular institutional
competencies would have been useful to the enterprise of determining the
status of restrictive covenants. On Professor Strauss’ and Professor Rose’s
accounts, the propriety of unenforceability turns on an assessment of countrywide (or at least state-wide) social facts. Answered must be such questions as:
(1) are there cultures and customs of prejudice so widespread as to have the
practical force of law? (2) Is discrimination the product of a complex set of
governmental and private interactions? These determinations are more readily
made through legislative fact-finding than by judges in a single adjudication
involving a particular plaintiff and defendant.
The legislative and executive branches also appropriately play an
important role under the approaches of Professors Henkin, Glennon and
Novak, though demonstrating this is more complex. In the views of Professors
Henkin, Glennon and Novak, the determination of whether a private
agreement should be judicially enforced turns on a balancing of competing
constitutional principles. The more political branches appropriately play an
important role in this type of decisionmaking process. On what basis,
however, is it to be decided whether the commitment to eliminating vestiges
of slavery outweighs, or is outweighed by, commitments to liberty and
property? There seems (to me, at least) to be a ready answer, but logic is not
what drives the answer. Deciding among these competing constitutional
commitments involves what philosophers have called a choice among
incommensurable values. Incommensurability concerns choices between (or
among) options that cannot be reduced to a single metric that captures
everything that matters about the options and that thereby permits
comparisons with which all rational agents would agree. Incommensurability
accordingly describes the arena of choice in which subjective evaluations must
be made. Choosing among incommensurables amount to a process of
prioritizing competing commitments. As such, it can well be understood as
both reflecting and defining the very character of the person or polity that is
making the decision.
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The tradeoffs that Professors Henkin, Glennon and Nowak identify as
occupying the core of state action analysis require the choice among
incommensurable values because there is no common metric by which the
commitments to desegregation, association, and liberty of contract can be
measured. As is true of other situations that call for the choice among
incommensurables, determining the hierarchy of constitutional commitments
and how competing principles are to be harmonized is a subjective process that
reflects the very character of the decisionmaker and that shapes the political
culture of which the Constitution is a part. There is no basis for concluding
that the judiciary has exclusive competence in making such decisions. Indeed,
it would seem that the more political branches appropriately play an important
role in a decisionmaking process such as this that is so subjective and characterdefining.
Turning to step 3 of the analysis, the question is whether the executive
and legislative branches have institutional characteristics unsuited to solving the
problem of restrictive covenants. The major concern, it would seem, is that the
more political branches are more likely to reflect only majoritarian preferences,
overlooking minority interests. For example, what if Congress had either
preempted or responded to Shelley by passing a law that confirmed the
legitimacy of restrictive covenants? On the approach I have advocated here,
Congress would have had the power to do this, rendering Shelley’s ban on
judicially enforcing racial covenants vulnerable to majoritarian politics. Three
considerations, however, considerably soften the force of this critique. First,
perhaps there is less need to be so suspicious that the legislative branch will
advance only the majority’s interests. In the present context, after all, Congress
had spoken, having enacted legislation (sections 1981 and 1982) that protected
the minority’s interests by provided a ready basis for ruling that the restrictive
covenants themselves violated federal statutory law.
Second, as a pragmatic matter, there are serious doubts to whether the
Court alone can bring about change in society absent congressional support.
Consider in this regard the new wave of scholarship that questions the extent
to which Brown v. Board of Education advanced the cause of racial
desegregation. These scholarly works provide data strongly suggesting that
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desegregation did not diminish until Congress joined in the effort by enacting
civil rights legislation in the 1960s. This is not to deny that the Supreme
Court played an important role in placing school desegregation on the nation’s
political agenda, but only to suggest that multi-branch involvement is
necessary for concrete change to occur. If this is correct, then the force of the
hypothetical mentioned above is largely dissipated: if real societal change
requires not only judicial action but also the legislature’s support, then there is
not much of a difference between (1) a Court opinion disallowing enforcement
of restrictive covenants in the face of Congress’ unwillingness to implement the
Court’s declaration and (2) Congress’ embrace of restrictive covenants and the
absence of judicial power to reverse the legislature’s decision (as would be the
case under this Article’s approach, which argues that the issue of restrictive
covenants was properly addressed either through statute or federal common
law).
It might be objected that the Court would not have been able to lend
its voice to societal debate concerning restrictive covenants if Congress had
approved such covenants in accordance with the power this Article suggests
that belongs to Congress. This objection is not convincing. Even if the Court
had been without power to overturn legislation authorizing the enforcement
of restrictive covenants, the Court could have severely criticized the statute as
a normatively unfortunate way of harmonizing commitments of liberty to
contract and associate (on the one hand) and anti-discrimination commitments
(on the other) as the Court bemoaned its own institutional responsibility to
defer to Congress’ judgment. In effect, such a Court opinion could have
served as a judicial dissent to Congress’ decision. Although mainstream
dissents within judicial opinions do not possess the power to bring their visions
into effect at the time they are penned, the dissenting ideas not infrequently
remain in the judicial consciousness and become mainstream doctrine at later
points in time. The same could well occur to judicial opinions that function as
dissents to congressional decisions: they may initiate or solidify public and
congressional opinion that rejects the policy judgments undergirding a statute,
leading to the statute’s appeal.
Third, a congressional statute authorizing restrictive covenants and
their judicial enforcement may be unconstitutional after all. The first question,
of course, is whether Congress has authority to enact a statute of this sort in
the first place. Even assuming that it does, such a statute might violate the
Equal Protection Clause. In view of the widespreadness of racially restrictive
covenants at the time, and the result that African-Americans had great
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difficulty finding communities in which they could live, it plausibly could be
argued that a statute authorizing such restrictive covenants would have been
the result of invidious discrimination.
311

CONCLUSION
Nearly sixty years of post-Shelley caselaw and scholarly commentary
have failed to provide an adequate rationalization for Shelley v. Kraemer. This
Article has suggested that the legal community’s lack of success in explaining
Shelley may be attributable to the (until now) universal effort to ground the case
in the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article instead has argued that Shelley is
best understood as growing from the soil of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Shelley readily could have been decided on the basis of two federal statutes that
have been in existence since the late nineteenth century. Even if Congress had
not enacted sections 1981 and 1982, the Court could have declared the racially
restrictive covenants illegal under the quasi-federal common law of
“constitutional preemption.”
The Article then catalogued and elaborated the many benefits of
reconceptualizing Shelley as a Thirteenth Amendment-based case. The
Thirteenth Amendment is more conceptually compelling because what made
the racially restrictive covenants troublesome was not their enforcement but
the substance of the covenants themselves, which was the result of the
decisions of individuals. The Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth,
applies to individuals, and hence provides a basis for declaring the racially
restrictive covenants themselves to be illegal, not just their enforcement. This
solves a long-standing embarrassment of Shelley’s analysis: the Court’s
conclusion that racially restrictive covenants themselves were perfectly legal.
Furthermore, the Thirteenth Amendment approach is far more
consistent with post-Shelley case law, which virtually never holds that judicial
enforcement of individuals’ contracts constitutes sufficient state involvement
to trigger the application of constitutional constraints to the contracts’
substantive provisions. Continuing to conceptualize Shelley as a Fourteenth
Amendment decision accordingly introduces confusion and inconsistency into
state action doctrine. Correlatively, removing the almost universally-known
Shelley case from the state action context may permit the creation of a more
principled state action doctrine, as that body of law no longer will be obliged
to accommodate Shelley’s conceptually-plagued state action holding.
Moreover, understanding Shelley as a Thirteenth-Amendment based
decision has important institutional implications. Whereas Shelley’s Fourteenth
Amendment approach allocated the determination of what contracts should be
enforceable solely to courts, the Thirteenth Amendment approach invites
Congress and the President to participate in determining what types of
restrictive covenants (or other activities) qualify as incidents or badges of
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slavery. The Article’s identification of the highly subjective and characterdefining decisionmaking that is involved in such determinations establishes the
desirability of the more political branches’ participation in this process.
Finally, Shelley helped create a constitutional culture that largely
overlooks the Thirteenth Amendment and instead primarily relies on
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection principles in its
quest for justice. Reorienting Shelley in the manner advocated here may help
revive largely dormant Thirteenth Amendment principles.
To conclude, Shelley’s approach has had unintended and unappreciated
pernicious consequences that can be remedied by understanding Shelley’s
holding as growing from the Thirteenth rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment. For these reasons, even if the Fourteenth Amendment route
Shelley adopted were a wise strategy all things considered to have adopted at the
time – a complex historical and normative question that this Article does not
pursue – there are good reasons for the legal culture to reconceptualize Shelley
now.

